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Annotation
In this work we make analysis of the tax evasion practices which have become widely used 
by the small and medium enterprises in the Russian transitional economy. Taxation has 
always been the issue best describing relations between state and private business; in 
Russian economy taxation has come to characterize specificity of interactions between 
authorities at different levels of government and businessmen. We look at the current 
situation through the theoretical framework provided by the neoinstitutional theory which 
allows us to consider data and facts collected on the problem through the perspective of 
institutional change. By employing analytical tools of the neoinstitutionalism we consider 
tax evasion as a part of evolving institutional environment. Persistence and prevalence of the 
schemes used by small businesses to avoid payment of full tax liabilities leads us to qualify 
the current situation as an institutional dead-lock or in other words inefficient socio-
economic equilibrium: tax-evasion is seen as an illegal activity by the state and 
development-hampering by businesses, nonetheless the practice persists for decades. We 
consider that institutions are promoted and supported by different groups united by common 
socio-economic interest, therefore to describe and analyse this situation we identify the main 
interest groups involved in the creation and maintenance of the existing socio-economic 
balance. We consider that the most influential institution affecting these groups was created 
from the fusion of interests of the state authorities and enterprise managers in the Soviet
economy but which persists to the present day thus providing the structure that maintains the 
situation of current institutional equilibrium.
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I) Introduction
The institutional change that took place in Russia in the aftermaths of the Soviet
Union dissolution was one of the most comprehensive changes of an institutional 
environment known in history. The whole set of institutions were to be replaced to meet 
requirements of the market economy and democracy.  In Russia, as in many other post-
communist countries, ideas and political commitments concerning the organisation of the 
state and economy underwent profound transformation at the speed with which physical 
production could not keep up; outdated equipment, broken economic links, and a multitude 
of other micro-economic factors created a difficult socio-economic environment, against 
which, however, small and medium-size private sectors started rapid development. The 
number of grass-root start-ups was booming, helping to absorb the unemployed workers 
released by the crumbling public sector. 
The importance of the small and medium private sector for economic development is 
difficult to overestimate. In many countries of the European Union, China and the USA the 
net contribution of small businesses to the economy is over 50% of GDP. In Russia,
tumultuous development of small and medium businesses of the first years has left after 
itself a well-anchored in the society sector of private business. However, the practices of 
avoiding full tax payments which were adopted by many small and medium enterprises in 
the early years remain almost unchanged. The phenomenon of tax-evasion, although existing
in almost all economic systems, in Russia took the form of massively widespread and 
elaborated schemes which were allowed to flourish receiving almost no resistance from the 
state officials. 
In this thesis the focus of research is placed on the tax-evasion practices used by 
small and medium de novo enterprises. This phenomenon appeared in the period of 
abolishment of the old Soviet institutions and introduction of the new ones. Tax-evasion 
itself became possible because of the appearance of the institutions of private property and 
private business activity, and first of all, due to the reformulation of the relation terms 
between the state authorities and enterprises. Unlike in the Soviet time when fiscal relations 
between state and enterprises depended on a decision of central authorities to transfer funds 
from the profit-making enterprises, the newly institutionalized relation between state and 
business had at its core a new form of contractual obligations. This massive institutional 
change was undertaken in the first years of transition but unfortunately most of it failed to be 
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fully adopted by the economic actors and had to remain on paper. We attribute the extensive 
growth of the tax-evasion practices to one of such institutional failures.
In order to examine causes and mechanism of the tax-evasion among small and 
medium enterprises we apply the theory of neoinstitutional economics. According to this 
theory, institutions, that is, the sets of rules governing socio-economic organisation, are the 
main factors influencing economic development. Analytical framework of 
neoinstitutionalism allows us to study tax evasion in the context of institutional 
development, which lends a special angle on this problem.
The aim of the thesis is to explain the persistence of tax-evasion among small and 
medium enterprises. The vocabulary of the neoinstitutional theory allows us to qualify this 
phenomenon as a bad equilibrium – the situation is estimated to be counter-productive to the 
economic development, but inspite of this it persists.  By studying the institutional 
environment we have selected institutions that exert immediate influence on the small and 
medium enterprises. These institutions and the economic actors that shape them constitute 
the main scope of the research. One of the institutions that in the course of preliminary 
research was identified as being the most influential is a very little researched upon 
institution of the administrative markets. This institution was created in the Soviet period by 
the members of nomenklatura as a form of second shadow economy allowing distribution of 
deficit products. This institution reposed on a special form of organisation between 
industrial and party elites, which continued to exist even after the collapse of the Soviet
system. This Soviet institution was reconfigured into a special business-authorities 
relationship which is one of the determinant features of the Russian post-transition economy. 
Other institutions that are included into the analysis are the newly introduced fiscal 
institution and the institution of federalism.  In our view, these recently introduced into the 
Russian economy institutions, have an impact on the institutional environment in which 
function small and medium enterprises. In the course of the study we place emphasis on the 
fact that these institutions had become dependent on the trajectory of previous institutional 
development, but also themselves contained flaws that reinforced the environment where the 
institution of administrative markets remained dominant.
The scope of research is deliberately reduced to a small number of institutions,
focusing only on those that in the researcher’s view have an immediate influence on the tax-
evasion among small businesses. However, institutions that are important in this respect go 
beyond the ones that are selected; they include efficient legislative institutions and an 
independent judiciary system, and a multitude of cultural norms. These institutions are 
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required to be fully functional and meet the criteria of justice, independence and efficiency, 
even though in reality it might not be so. 
For the sake of simplicity these institutions are not included into the framework of 
this research. We consider that even if the malfunctioning of these institutions can lead to 
the socio-economic disturbances, they mainly tend to aggravate the situation already created 
by the institutions and actors put under the focus of this research. Also, the cultural norms 
are recognised to be very important, but we consider that the phenomena studied in this 
work are more shaped by rational decisions of economic agents, thus the cultural aspect is 
also excluded from the analysis.
The hypothesis of the work is the following – the practices of tax-evasion among 
small and medium de novo enterprises are maintained by the institution of administrative 
markets. In the thesis I argue that the practices of tax-evasion among small and medium de 
novo enterprises are institutionalized and had become a part of an alternative institution 
which in this work is defined as the administrative market. The tax-evasion schemes are an 
extended part of the administrative market, which supports this institution and is being 
supported in return.  To test this hypothesis we examine the nature of the business-state 
relation. In the researcher’s point of view the existence of the institution of administrative 
markets which assures the strong linkage between the authorities and the business 
community explains existence of the inefficient economic equilibrium.
In the beginning, the description of the analytical tools offered by the neoinstitutional 
theory is made. We also discuss how this analytical framework can be employed better for 
the purposes of this research.  In the following section we will describe the tax evasion as an 
economic phenomenon. I will discuss the schemes mostly used by entrepreneurs, their 
motivation behind it and on what purposes the “saved” money is spent. In the next part we 
pass to the examination of the most influential institutions. We examine their development 
and the groups of individuals that shape and maintain them. I argue that the institutional 
equilibrium is being created on the political market where demand and supply for different 
institutions is constituted by different socio-economic groups. The equilibrium is reached 
when demand and supply for the institution are in balance, but only interest groups  invested 
with sufficient political power can provide enough demand and secure supply. 
On the basis of the information collected in the two preceding parts of the research 
we make an analysis of the current relation between small and medium business and 
xauthorities. In the concluding section we propose measures that can help to shift the current 
situation to a new more equitable and efficient equilibrium.
II) Research Framework
1. Methods
The theory of neoinstitutional economics is a concept that provides vigorous analysis 
of economic and social behaviour, but in the words of Thrainn Eggertsson “the success of 
neoinstitutional economics will depend on finding the appropriate blend of theorizing and 
empirical work.”1 Empirical research, which is needed to support neoinstitutional theory, is 
usually confronted by a difficulty of finding solid statistical data on which the analysis can 
be built; this is why research of institutional environments has to draw on evidence from 
different kinds of sources. Another difficulty comes from the fact that institutional 
environments consist of the elements which are interdependent and co-influencing; in order 
to make analysis of a particular socio-economic phenomenon, researcher needs to cut across 
several institutional layers.
In the context of this particular research the work is complicated by the fact that 
some of the main institutions under investigation are informal, that is, their mechanisms are 
hidden from statistical observation and the analysis of them can be made only by using 
circumstantial evidence. The focus of research is placed on the tax-evasive activities which 
make part of illegal or at least shadow economic activity. The workings of tax-evasion 
practices are therefore also hidden, although they have been under attention of many 
researches and a substantial body of various data on this subject exists. Therefore the main 
difficulty of the analysis is the feature of informality which is inherent to almost all main 
objects of this research. 
This difficulty is to a significant extent alleviated by the information provided in the 
course of personal in-depth interviews of different economic actors. The phenomenon of 
tax-evasion, which is at the center of research, will be introduced through the analysis of 
publications and data on this subject. Close analysis of comments made by entrepreneurs in 
media and in-depth interviews conducted by researchers and journalists gives insight into the 
incentives of tax-evasion as well as on the nature of relation between state officials and 
businessmen.
                                                          
1
Eggertsson, Thrainn Economic, Behaviour and Institutions, Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990., P.31.
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The literature review reveals that the subject of economic development in the 
transition period in Russia was examined under different angles by many scholars. 
Researchers such as Vadim Radaev and Andrei Yakovlev were primarily focused on the 
study of relations between economic agents and authorities using the information collected 
during the in-depth interviews. Jan Winiecki and Steven L. Solnik have done works 
consecrated to the study of development of the Soviet industrial and party elite. Simone 
Kardonsky gave an extensive description of the administrative markets as a shadow form of 
Soviet economy. Also a valuable contribution is provided by the works of Daniel Treisman, 
Lev Freinkman and Michael Haney in the domain of development of fiscal federalism in 
Russia. Analysis is supported by information from the Russian press providing examples of 
economic behaviour of different groups under study. 
The basis of the analysis reposes on information mainly provided by the works of 
authors cited above. The analytical framework of the institutional theory allows the 
regrouping of different pieces of information in a new coherent whole which supports the 
proposed hypothesis. In order to include institutions of administrative markets into this 
analytical framework, the theoretical tools of the neoinstitutionalism were extended. As a 
result of this work, this thesis presents a new analysis of the system made from the angle of 
institutionalism allowing us to make authentic observations of the socio-economic 
development and produce specific recommendations.
2. The Theory of Neoinstitutional Economics
Institutional theory was chosen as the main analytical framework of this research, 
first of all because the phenomena under investigation first appeared in the midst of the 
socio-economic development which followed one of the most impressive changes of 
regulatory system in history – the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Countries 
that emerged from it had to face the task of changing at the same time economic, social and 
political frameworks governing their societies. Even though in the beginning of transition 
the priority was given to the macro-economic measures, it soon became evident that in the 
case of Russia, compliance with these measures are not sufficient in order to put country on 
the rails of a well-functioning market economy. It soon became clear that more attention 
should be given to the study of the institutional environment, development of new 
institutions and their proper integration.
First we start by looking in what way the theory of neoinstitutional economics is 
important for the analysis of tax-evasion among small and medium enterprises in Russia. 
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Analytical tools offered by the neoinstitutional theory served as a basis for the research. By 
putting the collected data and facts in a perspective where institutions are considered to be 
the main factors of socio-economic development, we developed the theory explaining 
preservation of the inefficient equilibrium.
2.1 Institutions
The theory of neoinstitutional economics is young and first works in this field were 
aimed at filling the gaps of the neoclassical theory which lacked the tools to explain 
particular outcomes of economic development. Strong points of the neoclassical model,
which simplified economic life to the point when it became clear and universally applicable, 
also constitute its major weaknesses. The neoclassical model assumes that all economic 
actors are rational, they dispose of complete information about the surrounding environment, 
their property rights are fully protected, and to design an optimal way of behaviour they only 
need to know relative prices. It is self-evident that reality only rarely corresponds to the 
situations that can be fully described by this theory. 
By adding different concepts which included the bounded rationality of individuals, 
their individualistic aims and tendency to opportunism, imperfect information, imperfect 
protection of property rights, the economists expanded the boundaries of the neoclassical 
theory. The new economic model was extensively reconfigured, so much so that the 
neoclassical theory is considered by many institutionlists to be able to describe only certain 
possibilities among many that can be covered by neoinstitutional economics. Economists of 
the neoinstitutional branch aim to theorisize different kinds of eventualities, which 
inevitably encounter many difficulties, as forms of socio-economic behaviour are too varied 
to be easily simplified to become the foundation of a theory.
Nonetheless, advantages of the neoinstitutional theory are undeniable: it proposes 
powerful analytical tools that allow to sufficiently explain complex social and economic 
performance of different societies. By adding social dimension, the neoinstitutional theory 
allows us to consider economic development in the context of rules that structure interaction 
of individuals in a particular society. These rules according to which socio-economic 
systems develop are institutions. Institutions were identified as a cornerstone of the 
neoinstitutional theory.
Institutions perform a number of important socio-economic functions. First of all, 
they organise society within a certain framework by limiting the number of strategies that 
can be undertaken: some behaviour is approved of and encouraged and some is prohibited. 
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Secondly, institutions constitute a long term strategy which can be followed along a whole 
life-time and transmitted to future generations; thus institutions are persistent and assure the 
preservation of certain knowledge and practices. Among particular institutions we can 
distinguish between institutions that provide information, termed the institutions of 
coordination and institutions of cooperation which assure interaction between individuals 
through the conclusion of contracts. Institutions of redistribution are of different nature as 
they assist redistribution of already created wealth.
By creating regulations accepted by society or at least known by all its members, 
institutions provide predictability of future developments and therefore much valued 
stability. All these listed functional qualities of institutions serve one end – the minimisation 
of transaction costs.
2.2 Transaction costs
All the aforementioned concepts which were elaborated by institutionalists, such as bounded 
rationality of individuals, their individualistic aims and tendency to opportunism, imperfect 
information, and imperfect protection of property rights constitute the category of 
transaction costs, all allowed institutions to emerge as the determinant factors of economic 
performance. As expressed in the Coase theorem the institutions would make no difference 
to economic performance if transaction costs were equal to zero. Transaction costs in their
simple definition are all the costs that are incurred in the course of economic activity but 
distinct from the production costs; in one way or another they relate to the process of 
acquiring information about exchange. From the empirical evidence we know that 
transactions are not costless, they are accompanied by a multitude of expenses that,
according to the classification North-Eggertsson,2 can range from the information search 
activities, bargaining, contract making, monitoring to the contract enforcement measures and 
protection from the third parties.
Institutions regulate the amount and structure of transaction costs engendered in the 
course of exchange, in the same way as technologies regulate the amount and structure of 
production costs. Better designed technologies involve less production costs, just as better 
functioning institutions result in less transaction costs.
                                                          
2 Eggertsson, Thrainn, Economic Behaviour and Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990
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The concept of transaction costs is one of the building blocks of the neoinstitutional 
theory. Transaction costs accentuate the importance of instructions and help to assess the 
efficiency of a particular institution or institutional environment as a whole: well-
functioning institutions will decrease transaction costs on activities that society considers 
beneficial. In its turn, lower transaction costs will facilitate transactions and enhance 
economic efficiency.  At the same time, precise assessment of transactions costs involves 
many difficulties. The main problem consists in close interlinkage between production and 
transaction costs, but also in the absence of an exact definition of transaction costs. 
2.3 Formal, Informal and Alternative Institutions
Douglas North defines institutions as formal and informal rules that constrain 
individual behaviour and shape human interaction.3 Formal and informal institutions have 
overlapping as well as contradicting qualities. Formal institutions are based on formal rules,
normally fixed in laws and regulations, and the central authority is invested with the 
responsibility to assure compliance with rules of all individuals. Strong points of formal 
institutions are their visibility and clarity to everyone. Also, rules designed for a particular 
group apply to all members of it and exemptions can be justified only on specific grounds. 
Informal institutions, by contrast, are not regulated by a central authority, but rather 
exist in the society by acquiescence of all its members. Informal institutions, although 
sometimes being as significant as formal ones, are less clear in definition and application, 
which can vary from one community to another. 
For the purpose of this thesis, we extend and modify the concept of informal 
institutions, as the existing definition does not fully describe the phenomenon under 
investigation. As a basis of new analytical concept we take the informal institution, but we 
consider informal institutions as not only shaped by culture, habits and routine, as proposed 
by Douglas North4, but rather by rational interests and economic incentives. 
We suggest that this particular form of informal institutions can be developed by 
social groups when formal institutions are considered less than efficient, or when certain 
groups of individuals who are invested with political and economic power do not consider 
formal institutions efficient from their point of view. The resulting informal institutions are 
                                                          
3 North, Douglas.C.. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990
4 North, Douglas.C.. 1990
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regulated by some sort of organised but not official structure. We term this special form of 
informal institution – the alternative institution.
An alternative institution is an institution which functions in parallel to formal 
institutions, although it is not enforced by the official authority. Alternative institutions 
which we consider in this thesis exist in the shadow of the official economy, although they 
should not be identified with criminal activity as they do not serve criminal ends as such. 
Alternative institutions allow actors to reach legal objectives by circumventing legally 
approved institutions.
Individuals recur to the alternative institutions because they allow them to 
accomplish certain transactions at a lower transaction cost. As the goal of this transaction is 
within the boundaries of law, the formal institution which proposes the same transaction 
either imposes very high transaction costs, or allows very restricted access to these 
transactions. As a consequence, individuals choose to use the alternative institution.
Alternative institutions exist because they keep all their activities informal. 
Informalisation is essential. The main negative side of alternative institutions is this 
informality. Rules of alternative institutions are implicit and not visible to all members of 
society, thus these institutions although sometimes governing major socio-economic 
processes are accessible only to the selected parts of society.
2.4 Institutional Change
There are different theories describing what can prompt the disappearance of some 
institutions and the introduction of others. All types of institutional changes can be divided 
for the sake of simplicity into two categories: institutional changes that can happen 
discreetly or incrementally.
Incremental change happens through the historical development of the society by 
means of negotiations and adjustments. This change takes long periods of time to be 
accomplished, but as it emerges through the immediate practices and is adopted through the 
principle of trial and error, and most of all, it is very persistent.
The discreet changes of institutions are more visible because they happen almost 
instantaneously by the introduction of law or decree, or in the aftermaths of any kind of 
revolutionary event. Most usually the source of a new institution represents some form of 
centralised power, commonly the state. 
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In the case of incremental institutional change, a new institution emerges through 
practice and negotiations between different socio-economic groups, and only then can be 
fixed in the form of law, the discreet institutional change is imposed on the population from 
above. However, the introduction of a new institution does not guarantee its immediate 
implementation and the costs of securing compliance with new institutions can be 
prohibitively high. In this case it is not only the fact of the introduction of a new institution 
that makes the institutional environment change, but also the extensive measures undertaken 
by the government enforcing the implementation of new rules.
2.5 Institutional Equilibrium
The question that arises in respect of the theories of the institutional change is how 
the composition of the institutional environment finds its equilibrium and who decides what 
institutions are preserved and which are dispensed of.  The evolutionary vision of 
institutional change developed by Friederich Hayek and Armen Alchian states that 
competition between different institutions in the course of development eliminates “weak” 
institutions and allows the survival of those institutions that enable the most efficient 
coordination between individuals and organisations. According to this theory, the 
institutional evolution will continue until it produces institutions that provide the highest 
standards of living for the biggest share of society. 
However, that does not imply that all existing institutions are the most optimal for 
the societies in which they function; to achieve such a degree of efficiency, institutions have 
to quickly adapt to the changing environment which is extremely difficult if not impossible 
to accomplish. The theoretical framework proposed by Hayek and Alchian refers rather to 
the changes that happen over long periods of time and does not take into consideration the 
possibility of institutional deadlock.
If we assume as correct that the competition for survival among institutions leads to 
the “equilibrium institutions,”5 then there is no guarantee that this equilibrium is efficient. 
Douglas North, one of the founders of institutional theory, emphasises that, “Institutions are 
not always and necessarily efficient; institutions or at least formal rules are made in order to 
                                                          
5 Eggertsson, Thrainn, Economic Behaviour and Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 
P.68.
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serve interests of those in the position of power. This power allows them to influence and 
create new rules.”6
In this respect it is important to examine two factors that can be considered as two 
major forces that modify the trajectory of the institutional development, which otherwise 
would be closer to the optimal efficiency: institutional path dependence and interest groups 
in control of the political market.
2.6 The Theory of Institutional Path Dependence and Interest Groups
The theory of Path Dependency was originally developed to describe problems 
occurring in the course of technological evolution when an early choice in technology 
impedes introduction of more efficient solutions. This concept is also employed as an 
important part of neoinstitutional theory as it reaffirms the idea of institutions being a 
determinant factor of economic and social development.
First, the theory of institutional path dependence states that institutions, once adopted 
by society, are very difficult to change and all further institutional development in this 
society will be influenced by the institutions that preceded it. From this we can conclude that 
a society is not entirely free in choosing which institutions it can adopt: some institutions 
will be accepted better than others, and probably will be more efficient than others. Even if a 
project of better socio-economic organisation already exists, and the main task consists only 
in introducing it into a new society, it should be taken into consideration that this new 
institution is not going to be introduced on the “virgin territory” but into an environment that 
had already accumulated its own practices. Therefore the new institution will inevitably, at 
least in the beginning, take form of the recipient institutional environment. To arrive at a 
different result, special measures of enforcement and adjustment should be undertaken.
If we consider closer what lies at the basis of institutional path dependency, we will 
see that a major factor impeding the introduction of new practices is the high cost that it 
incurs. Costs can include the purely physical introduction of new equipment or technology, 
as well as the change in individual behaviour.
                                                          
6 North, Douglas.C.. essay Institutional Economics and Development, Washington University, accessed on 
03.04.2011, http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpeh/9309002.html.
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Another important feature of the theory of institutional path dependence is that it 
suggests a possibility of arriving at multiple equilibria along the trajectory of socio-
economic development of a particular society, some of which can be less than Pareto-
efficient. This possibility is reinforced by the existence of special interest groups which 
influence the institutional environment through participation on the political market.7
Institutions appear and disappear not because of their intrinsic qualities, but because 
of the power of different interest groups to support or oppose them. New institutions can be 
provided by the state as well as developed by the society, but institutional equilibrium can 
be achieved only when the supply of institutions equals its demand. The supply and demand 
of institutions takes place on the political market, where the supply of and demand for 
institutions is provided by certain groups that are invested with the most of economic and 
political power. Goods traded on this market are different sets of rules governing social and 
economic activity – Institutions.
Supply and demand for institutions can be provided by different actors. The main 
supplier of institutions is the state, but the state has the power to only assure compliance 
with enforced rules, decisions of what institution is adopted lie with different lobbying and 
pressure groups.
The demand for institutions is defined by transaction costs which they can modify.8
Different institutions  raise or decrease transaction costs on different activities, hence 
different socio-economic groups will be supporting institutions that allow to undertake 
transactions serving their interests at a lower cost. The supply of institutions is defined by 
the costs of enforcement, which can be carried by the state or an interest group.
All bargaining processes take place on the political market. Political markets are 
markets were interests of different socio-economic groups are confronted to form an 
institutional environment. The functioning of the political market was described in general 
terms by Eggertsson as, “Individuals acting alone or in a group, can maximize their wealth 
either by focusing solely on production within the existing framework of institutions or by 
seeking favourable changes in laws and regulations from rulers, legislature and government 
                                                          
7 Shastitko,A.I. Novaya Institucionalnaya Ekonomicheskaya Teoria (New Institutional Economics), Moscow: 
Lomonosov Moscow State University TEIS, 2002
8 Valevich, Uriy, Institucinalniy Ekilibrium (Institutional Equilibrium), accessed 02.02.2011, 
http://research.by/pdf/2002n2r04.pdf
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bureaus. The path chosen depends on the relative price of obtaining favourable changes in 
the structure of rights. When the price is low, wealth seeking by compact special-interest 
groups can generate economic institutions that allow a community to realize only a fraction 
of its technical capacity for production.”9  Different interest groups advocate institutions that 
fit their interests, but ultimately all participants of the political market want to reach 
stability. Institutional stability facilitates economic development, although not all situations 
of institutional stability are optimal.
2.7 Definitions
Institution – formal and informal rules governing interactions in a society.
Institutional environment – a system composed of a variety of institutions which by 
interacting with each other constitute a whole. Considering the interdependence of 
institutions in this system, malfunctioning of one of them can lead to the distortion of the 
whole institutional environment. 
Alternative institution – a special form of informal institution, which is regulated by an 
organised structure, and usually functions in parallel with a formal institution serving the 
same ends.
Economic actor – actor is a term more commonly used in sociology but also employed by 
institutionalists. Unlike in the neoclassical theory where actions of the economic agent are 
determined by the external system and where the economic agent acquires functional 
character depending on the role which he plays in the system, the notion of economic actor
implies full consciousness of actions and of resulting consequences for the economic actor 
himself and other individuals.
Transaction cost – costs engendered in the course of economic transactions but not 
connected directly to the production processes.
Institutional path dependence – process of institutional innovation becoming depended on 
and therefore limited by the previously developed rules or habits.
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Interest group- a group of people usually characterised by the same socio-economic 
characteristics (revenue, profession etc.), and sharing common economic goals.
Institutional equilibrium – the state of balance achieved in the institutional environment, that 
is the currently functioning institutions are considered as abided by the whole society.
De novo enterprises – enterprises created by entrepreneurs independently of the public 
sector that is not as a result of privatisation or state-private business joint projects.
Political market – process of negotiating institutional arrangements.
III)  Analysis
1. Tax-Evasion as an Economic Phenomenon
During the years of transition in Russia, it has become common knowledge that 
many firms and companies were in one way or another trying to avoid payment of the whole 
sum of tax liabilities. The first studies conducted to evaluate new for the post-Soviet country 
economic phenomenon, faced difficulty closely associated to the study of illegal activities: 
scarcity of hard data. In the following section we draw on different sources of information 
in order to specify the scale of the phenomenon, schemes used by entrepreneurs, their 
motivation, and to what purposes the “saved” money is disbursed.
1.1 Scale
The main difficulty in assessing the scale of the phenomenon consists in the fact that 
information relating to the shadow activities can be hardly collected in the course of a 
general survey. To overcome this problem many researchers were trying to assess the 
amount of imposed by law but not paid taxes, by establishing the link between the cash mass 
circulating in the economy and the non-paid taxes. This method is sufficiently robust, as 
most tax evasion is made through converting into cash a part of the business profit, but in 
the case of the volatile economic development of transitional Russia this method is very 
difficult to implement. Although the use of cash money in Russia after 1991 had increased 
dramatically, it is very difficult to say what part of this increase is due to the tax-evasion. 
Information obtained directly from businessmen proves to be indispensable in this 
situation.  One relatively simple method consists of asking managers how much of the 
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business transaction is paid by cash. Cash payments are restricted, for example, in Russia the 
amount of payment allowed to be made by a legal entity within one day  is restricted to 
100 000 rubles per transaction (60 000 rubles before 22.07.2007).10 Also, it is an empirically 
proven fact that conversion into cash serves as a basis for concealing part of the revenues. 
Thus, the link between cash paid transactions and illegal activities is made. At the same 
time, whereas direct questions on the subject of tax-evasion can be refused, asking the 
amount of cash payments can yield more genuine information on the basis of which the 
hypothesis of how much money is actually concealed from tax authorities can be elaborated. 
According to such estimates made by A. Yakovlev11 on the basis of interviews conducted in 
the period 1995-1996 in which participated 227 businessmen, the share of inter-enterprises 
transactions paid by cash amounted to 30%, and according to the Bulletin of the Wholesale 
Commerce Surveys in the years 1999-2001 the same indicator was approximately at the 
same level 25-28%. 12 More than 50% of respondents that participated in the research
conducted by the Bulletin of the Wholesale Commerce Surveys indicated that they use cash 
payments first of all in order to speed up and simplify transactions, and 49% mentioned 
using the cash payments in order to reduce the full sum of tax liabilities.
However, the main source of information allowing us to understand the mechanism 
and motivation of the tax-evasion is the in-depth interviews. The organization of interviews 
with managers or owners of businesses requires the fulfillment of a number of conditions, 
the main of which are confidentiality and anonymity. The results obtained through these 
interviews represent valuable information for researchers concerned with the subject. 
In this respect, in order to describe the details of tax-evasion, the results of two in-
depth interviews are used: the first is the survey of the business environment conducted as a 
part of the research project of the Center of Political Technology, Moscow. The survey was 
supervised by Vadim Radaev, Head of the Department of Economic Sociology, Higher 
School of Economics, Moscow and published  as a book “Formation of New Russian 
Markets: Transaction Costs, Control Measures and Business Ethics.”13 The second set of 
data was collected during the research under the supervision of Andrei Yakovlev. The 
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collected results together with other related data collected by the Higher School of 
Economics was published in the book written by A. Yakovlev “Agents of Modernisation” 
dedicated to the question of business development in Russia.
Figures obtained in the survey conducted by Vadim Radaev help us to assess the 
prevalence of tax-evasion. Eighty four percent of interviewed businessmen designated tax-
evasion as the most frequent infringement perpetrated by enterprises. Tax-evasion is 
followed by a less significant figures of: violation of financial regulations (10%), contract 
infringement (10%), violation of the Labour Code (3%), violation of registration and 
licensing procedures (2%), violation of private property rights (2%) and others -2%.
According to the assessments made by the experts of the National Institute for 
System Studies of Entrepreneurship, the share of shadow activity of an average enterprise 
amounted to 30-40% of its turn-over.14 According to the assessment made by the head of 
department of Development and Support of Small Business in Moscow, M. Vinogorodcev: 
“majority of small enterprises are employing “grey” schemes.”15 This data supports the 
statement that tax-evasion is a fairly wide-spread phenomenon in which more than an 
average number of enterprises is implicated and which also involves significant sums of 
money. 
1.2 Schemes
Furthermore, we list the most wide-spread schemes of tax-evasion among small and 
medium businesses, which are formed on the basis of information collected from the 
published researches on the subject, relevant literature and media reports.  According to 
Andrei Yakovlev, who made an extensive field-research on the subject of tax-evasion, the 
most widespread method of tax evasion among small and medium business in Russia is the 
release of cash through a fictitious firm.16 Several schemes exist. One of the most widely 
used involves creation of “fly-by-night” firms through which the money placed on the 
companies’ bank account can be converted into cash. In general terms the scheme operates 
in the following way: in order to reduce its revenues from which the tax liabilities are 
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deducted, a company creates a fictitious firm on which account it transfers money for a 
fictitious transaction, that is a transaction which didn’t take place but was formulated only 
for the purpose of tax evasion. After the money transfer is completed, the transferred 
through the intermediation of bank money, return to the company which initiated the 
scheme, but this time in the form of cash. In order to conceal transaction the fictitious firm 
disappears before the submission of the accounting documents on business activity to the tax 
authorities is due, that is at the end of the financial year’s quarter.
The cost of creating such a fictitious firm is around 1% of the sum involved in the 
transaction. The risk of being found out by the tax authorities is estimated by entrepreneurs 
and their intermediaries as minimal, as on the surface transaction is legal. This scheme is 
used predominantly by legal business as nominally all transactions are legal but traces of 
illegal operations disappear as fictitious firms disappear. According to the interviews, this 
scheme first appeared in Russian practice in 1992. First this practice was registered in 
Moscow but soon it spread in other regions. According to the information revealed by the 
tax authorities on the 01.01.2001 out of 3.2 million registered companies, only 0.7 million
submitted the tax declaration. Tax authorities estimate that around 2 million firms are 
fictitious, created for the sole purpose of tax-evasion.17
Another widely used scheme consists in the reduction of profit, but this scheme can 
be used only if all or a significant part of profit is made in cash, which in legal businesses is 
more prevalent among small-scale firms operating small transactions.
The next scheme known almost to all small businesses in Russia is the payment of 
salary in cash. This scheme is simple and involves effectively no risk to the employer, the 
agreement is made between employer and employee in the view of mutual benefit: no taxes 
are imposed on either of them.  These schemes allow firms to replace the most heavily taxed 
elements of the enterprise economic activity - profit and salary –by the less taxed expenses 
included in the cost of production.
The number of schemes goes beyond the ones listed above and includes such forms 
as the increase of operation costs, the unregistered sale and purchase of products, fake 
employment of handicapped persons with the view to obtain tax breaks and so on. For the 
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purpose of this thesis we indicate only the most prevalent schemes, as these are the ones that
make the largest economic difference. 
Taxes are often seen by entrepreneurs as the transaction costs which they try to 
reduce, in the case of many entrepreneurs, taxes became the preferred measure of cost 
reduction. The cost of organisation of the most widespread scheme based on the creation of 
a fictitious firm, as was indicated above, amounts only to a fraction of the sum involved in 
transaction, which, without a doubt, encourages its widespread implementation.  Further, it’s 
important to see what is the motivation behind organisation of the tax-evasion schemes and 
how resources “saved” from taxation are ultimately disbursed.
1.3 Motivation
Businessmen recognise that, despite being widely used in Russia, the tax-evasion 
schemes are not inherent to the business activity. Several studies conducted on the subject of 
motivation show that the main “push factors” are invariably high rates of taxation and 
corruption among legal authorities. According to the National Institute for System Studies of 
Entrepreneurship, main reasons of passing to the shadow economy, in the order of declining 
importance, are: high taxation, then corruption followed by semi-legal activity of business 
partners.18 According to the information collected in the course of in-depth interviews,19
businessmen express their complaints about the complicated Tax Code, high tax burden, 
contradicting laws. Also, businessmen claim that it is almost impossible to run a business 
without cutting costs through tax-evasion: the practice is so widespread that it makes 
automatically uncompetitive not to employ tax-evasion. Among other reasons businessmen 
mention as motivation the state as an inefficient provider of public goods. 
The responses collected through interviews can be summarized as follows: the 
motivation behind the organisation of tax-evasion schemes consists in following the rules 
accepted in the business community; they are seen as necessary steps to be taken in order to 
stay in business.  Besides, high rates of support of this business strategy are found in the 
society. As shown in the results of the Human Beliefs and Values Survey, the percentage of 
those in Russia who believe that tax evasion is never justifiable has dropped in the years 
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1989 -1999 from 53.0% of surveyed to 43.6%20 . Attempts to “steal from the state” are in 
general approved of by people that are not involved in business directly. Reasons for doing 
so are seen as completely legitimate.
1.4 Disbursement of money saved through tax-evasion schemes
Contrary to the belief that money concealed from taxation is used primarily for 
managers personal enrichment, the responses collected in the course of interviews indicate a 
rather functional utilization of saved funds. According to the information collected in the 
surveys conducted by National Institute for System Studies of Entrepreneurship 21 76% of 
the surveyed businessmen indicated that the saved money is used for salary payment, 58% 
of them confessed that money is used for unofficial payments to the authorities, and 50% of 
enterprises use the money for transacting with their partners. As the results of the surveys 
suggest, the money is mainly reinvested back into the business and is used for maintaining 
competitiveness, but also for direct payment to authorities.  When asked why these 
payments were necessary, businessmen pointed to the complexity of regulation, frequent 
checks of business documentation. In order to solve all these problems businessmen are 
often faced with open or implicit extortion of bribes by the authorities. Businessmen 
emphasized that barriers put by regulatory authorities are almost insurmountable unless paid 
for illegally.
The information collected directly from entrepreneurs using the tax-evasion schemes 
allows us to see in a greater detail its mechanism. Tax-evasion has become a part of the 
business environment, primarily instigated by a high tax burden and complex regulation. 
Once used by some businesses, the technique of tax-evasion schemes became generalized to 
the point that it became a feature of business competitiveness. It should be pointed out that 
for many enterprises a significant part of “saved” money is eventually paid to the authorities, 
but this time through informal channels. As will be shown later, these channels lead us 
promptly to authorities’ personal accounts, or to the local or regional funds. According to the 
research undertaken by the National Institute for System Studies of Entrepreneurship, the 
expenses of businessmen directed at overcoming administrative barriers amount to 6-7% of 
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the business revenue. 22 According to the estimates of the business association OPOR,
resources paid in corruption networks amount to 9.6% of the revenue.23
Thus, we can conclude that tax-evasion is not a phenomenon existing separately, but as 
a part of a relational system between business and authorities. To investigate causes and 
consequences of the tax-evasion, further analysis is focused on the institutional environment 
surrounding small and medium de novo enterprises and the link it creates between state and 
business community.
2. Institutions
In order to enlarge our understanding of the tax-evasion as a part of state-business 
linkage we make analysis of the institutional environment. The neoinstitutional theory used 
for the analysis allows us to put the facts at our disposal in a perspective which would 
provide an explanation for the wide-spread existence and persistence of tax-evasion. 
In the dichotomy state-business we focus on the state structures which come into 
contact with the business activity of de novo enterprises – state bureaucracy. Also we touch 
upon the role played in this by the central government and tax authorities.  Institutions 
making up the institutional environment are numerous; their influence on society as well as 
on each other is often reciprocal and overlapping. For the purpose of this study we selected 
only those that in the researcher’s view have the most immediate influence on the de novo 
enterprises’ propensity to tax evasion. These are institutions of the administrative market, 
fiscal institution and the institution of federalism. Each of these institutions and their effects 
will be studied in its turn.
2.1 The Institution of Administrative Markets: Shadow of the Soviet Economy
The term administrative market is borrowed from the concept developed by Simon 
Kardonsky in his book “Administrative Markets.”24 In his book, Simon Kardonsky describes 
the relations between different levels of the Soviet government structure which gave rise to 
the development of the second economy. In this thesis the concept proposed by Kardonsky 
is elaborated and analysed as a part of the institutional environment.
The institution of administrative markets takes an important part in the framing of 
this thesis because it helps to explain current state-business relations. Despite the dissolution 
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of the Soviet system in which it was created, the institution itself persisted even after 1991 in 
the new institutional environment. In the view of Simon Kardonsky the administrative 
markets are the most powerful institution of the Soviet time, and in the researcher’s view it 
is the most powerful economic institution in the current Russian environment. 
First, to understand the nature of this institution we examine the factors that assisted 
its development. These factors are complex, but they can be separated into two major 
groups: factors ensuing from the patron-agent problem and factors conditioned by the poor 
economic performance of the Soviet system. All these factors combined brought about the 
emergence of the alternative institution of administrative markets. 
2.1.1 Patron-agent problem
The phenomenon described by the agency theory is common throughout different 
social structures because it rests on the basic individual incentives to make full use of 
available resources. Any system based on the principal-agent relationship contains the 
ultimate information problem “agents know more about their own performance than do the 
principles.”25 The greater the complexity of the system - the multitude of layers and parallel-
running control systems – the more difficult it becomes to assure the transparency of 
information. Institutions are supposed to structure this instinctive behaviour by putting in 
place the system of checks and balances in order to limit opportunistic behaviour of the 
agent encouraged by the information asymmetry.  The scholarship of the Soviet system 
shows that Soviet institutions, contrary to the expected, were severely affected by this 
problem: the complexity of the control system and constant consumption deficit created 
perfect environment for the patron-agent fraud. 
Steven L. Solnick, having made the analysis of the Soviet command system, 
underlines the following fact, “All rights delegated through institutional hierarchies in the 
communist system were based on assumptions of the Party’s unchallenged hegemony, 
… but absent specific countermeasures from superiors, agents could easily begin to use the 
powers delegated to them as if they were their own.” 26 Many scholars come to the 
conclusion that the breakdown of patron-agent relationship in the Soviet system was 
conditioned by the complexity of the system and undetermined property rights. All property 
officially belonged to the state, but top levels of the government couldn’t assure control of 
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all factories and enterprises they possessed. Control over them had to be delegated to the 
lower managers. Realising that the full control of their actions could not be secured, lower-
ranking managers and officials developed the behaviour of using state-owned property as 
their own.
Devolution of the control over budgets and revenue sources to the lower levels of 
government undertaken in the 60s with the aim of invigorating the economy27 and making
its performance more efficient, produced the contrary economic effect: as property rights 
were not specified and changes were not perceived as permanent, officials at the lower 
levels of the government used the loosening of control for their own profit. 
In the words of F.J.M. Feldbruger, “An economic system of the Soviet type is 
artificial and therefore vulnerable construction. Unless it is propped up by a number of legal 
commands and prohibitions, the structure is likely to be fragmented.”28 As total control is 
extremely difficult to maintain over a long period of time, especially in a complex system 
such as the Soviet economy; despite all attempts to simplify and streamline it, managers 
acquired incentives to act in their own economic interests.
2.1.2 Personalised relations
The whole Soviet system was based on the principle of the strict following of 
commands and the pervasive control of higher levels of the government over lower ones. 
Hence, one of the basic needs of the officials was to insure the loyalty of their subordinates. 
This need became even more pronounced as the agents realised their own economic 
interests, which could be fulfilled by concealing some information from the ultimate 
authorities. The complicity between deferent actors in the system could be assured by the 
personal selection of subordinate officials. Many scholars point out the high personilisation 
of the Soviet system, “One of the principle instruments through which the party machine 
maintains a firm grip on the country’s political and socioeconomic system is its monopoly of 
personal selection.”29 Appointment to the different managerial positions depended chiefly 
on personal judgment of the candidate’s reliability in the hierarchy, rather than on 
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professional qualification. Using this logic it is easy to imagine how the initial design of the 
system can be corrupted by the desire of officials to appoint lower-ranking managers with 
the aim of securing their own interests.
The main actor of this relational system was the socio-economic group termed 
nomenklatura. As many researchers have shown 30 , members of it acted as effectively 
independent economic actors, though officially they were a part of the chain of command 
and were subordinate to the higher levels of the Soviet governing structure. Nomenklatura 
was made up primarily by party apparatchiks and members of economic bureaucracy. Their 
privileged position allowed them to interfere into the process of wealth creation. Their right 
as a communist party apparatus, to recommend and approve candidatures for all managerial 
positions, served as a basis for development of the economic relations not controlled by the 
party apparatus.
2.1.3 Inefficiency of the Soviet Economy: Lawless Position of the Enterprise
In the Soviet economic system the enterprise was central, but the least politically 
important element. It was deprived of any rights and had to act on the orders of various 
bureaucratic organisations. The enterprise became the only producing agent around which 
different bureaucratic agencies and organisations were constructed. These organisations 
effectively decided who was to be appointed to manage the enterprise. These back and forth 
exchanges developed a strong link between the enterprise and bureaucratic apparatus, 
especially on the local level.
One of the Soviet institutions that defined the position of the enterprise in the Soviet
system was the institution of planned production. According to the concept of this 
institution the enterprise was not free to decide how much to produce and at what price and 
to whom to sell.
The lawless position in which enterprises were confined is best expressed through 
the study of the Soviet tax system. As all enterprises officially belonged to the state and 
were controlled by the central party organisation, all profits or losses were referred to the 
state’s account. Enterprises were not seen as economic partners of the state, but as its 
directly controlled agents, and therefore, taxation of enterprises was arbitrary. The taxation 
system was not based on clearly stated rules and tax rates, instead some part of enterprise 
revenues were transferred from the profit-making enterprises to the unprofitable ones. In a
similar vein, the enterprise did not carry any responsibility for the loss-making. The soft 
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budget constraint is another salient feature of the Soviet economy. It produces a specific 
relationship between the firm and the state where a company is officially owned by the state 
and controlled by directives and a production plan sent from the higher levels of the 
government was not penalized for the inefficient production by closure or by a change of the 
management, but was instead directly subsidised. 
The rejection of the demand and supply rules by the Soviet economy resulted in the 
underproduction of consumption goods which in its turn led to the massive deficit of many, 
sometimes even basic, products. But goods were not impossible to find, they were only 
distributed through the “shadow” channels created by the nomenklatura. Bureaucrats did not 
have any rights to the products created by the state sector, however, they were in a position 
to appropriate a part of them and, taking advantage of the shortages, sell them on the shadow 
market. Thus the nomenklatura created an economy to supply goods which the state 
economy failed to supply. The factors of the persistent deficit and the personalised right of 
appointment made interests of enterprise managers and state officials converge. The 
relationship became entrenched into the social practices and institutionalized.
2.2 Soviet Shadow Market-like Economy
Many scholars specializing in the study of the Soviet economy come to the 
conclusion that far from being completely controlled by the party administration, the Soviet
economy was of a mixed character with a significant amount of products redistributed 
through the shadow economy, the number of which rapidly grew in the years 1960-1980.31
This statement is supported by Peter Ordeshook, who points out at the propensity of the 
society to create market relations even there where they are prohibited, “Whatever 
institutional structure state takes, the laws governing market forces cannot be abrogated  -
the forces of supply and demand operate regardless of culture, ethnic identity, socialization 
patterns, ideology and political system.”32
As was mentioned before, the members of political and economic elites were the 
ones who, in the situation of product scarcity and weak control, developed an institution 
which operated in parallel to the official planned economy. This conclusion is supported by 
the assessment of the World Bank researchers, “Any policy that creates an artificial gap 
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between demand and supply creates a profitable opportunity for opportunistic middlemen,”33
the opportunity which was effectively created and realised in the Soviet Russia.
Administrative officials, although being a part of official Soviet structure, act as 
independent economic actors. This concept of self-interested economic agents using the 
power of their position within a state structure in order to pursue their own goals was 
described by several scholars, including Shleifer and Vishny in their work “Politicians and 
Firms.”34
According to Aslund35, the privileged positions of officials in the hierarchy allowed
them to create in fact a more efficient economic system than the official government could 
offer. This system can be considered as more efficient as it was built to some extent 
according to the principles of the market economy, but otherwise this system of 
administrative markets was far away from being Pareto-efficient. It was built on the 
principles of exclusivity which allowed the privileged social group to increase its wealth 
disproportionally to the rest of the society; in the words of Aslund “they wanted the freedom 
of markets for themselves but regulations for others.” 36 Simon Kardonsky calls 
administrative markets the main institution of the Soviet system, “Where political and 
economic elements cannot be separated even for analytical purposes, and where social status 
is closely linked to the provision of consumption goods.”37 On this market could be sold all 
kinds of goods not normally available to the Soviet citizens, but only to selected groups of 
customers. Money as such is not the decisive instrument of this market but it is also used to 
make connections and recommendations.
The administrative market, although supported by a group of state officials, was an 
unofficial institution. It functioned alongside the officially endorsed system of institutions. 
Also, it did not emerge directly from the cultural or historic development of the country, 
although a certain influence of this kind cannot be completely excluded. But, as evidence 
shows, this institution was developed relatively quickly in response to the Soviet economic 
situation. Deficit, planned production and party privileges were the main factors that 
influenced the economic incentives of the best positioned socio-economic group of 
nomenklatura to develop the shadow economy. It was a rational strategy elaborated by a 
group of people, which fits the definition of an alternative institution.
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Based on this analysis we can conclude that the Soviet system was not totally 
centrally controlled, as there were many incentives and possibilities to conduct economic 
activities in the shadow of the official system, and the main initiators of the second shadow 
economic system were state officials at the lower levels of hierarchy. The political weight of 
these socio-economic groups is directly related to the strength of their economic base. The 
power of these groups originates from the close association of them with the industrial 
sector, that is, they were informally but effectively in control of the enterprises.
2.3 Socio-Economic Effects of the Institution of Administrative markets
The development of the market-like shadow economy along with the Soviet system 
has a dual consequence: on one hand people learnt the principles of market exchange, but on 
the other hand the illegal nature of these transactions in the environment of paternalism 
created incentives to overlook official rules which were considered irrelevant. The parallel 
development of market relations in Soviet times had accelerated the transition to the fully-
fledged market economy and at the same time impeded the instauration of the institutions 
essential to its well-functioning. Hence, it can be stated that development of the market 
economy did not start with the transition in the 90s, but the first stages of its formation took 
place in the midst of the Soviet period. It was primarily initiated and maintained by the 
administrative officials of the lower levels and the enterprise managers. This economy was 
created behind the less efficient official economy, but it did not serve the whole society 
because resources of the goods provision were controlled by managers and officials. The 
system, although it included some features of the market-based relations, was not based on 
the principles of economic freedom and competition.  Much in the nature of this relationship 
was carried over to the officially legalised market economy.
3. Structures that support continuation of the Administrative market
Although the institutions that served as a basis for development of the administrative 
markets, such as planned production, party ideology, soft budget constraints and the 
production deficit were banned and to a large extent phased out of the Russian economy, 
many features of the administrative markets stayed on. The strong link between government 
officials and enterprises which was characteristic of the Soviet shadow economy was 
reinvented in the time of transition and continues to be a part of economic reality today. 
In the next section the mechanisms that continue to support the institution of 
administrative market are analysed. In the researcher’s view, these mechanisms include old 
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nomenklatura-based regional elites, and political and economic incentives of the state 
officials which were largely affected by inconsistent implementation of the federal and fiscal 
systems.
As a result, the links which local authorities kept with the local enterprises 
characterised previously as administrative markets were reinforced and old alternative 
institutions became reinvigorated. Despite a much changed institutional environment the 
main feature of the institution of administrative markets was preserved – personalised 
relations between enterprises and authorities. As will be shown further, tax-evasion practices 
organised by small and medium businesses continue to constitute a part of this system.
3.1 Preservation of the Regional Elites
The fact of slowly changing or even stagnant composition of officials in the Russian 
regions became the focus of many studies. If political figures in the higher echelons of the 
government were almost completely replaced with the change of regime, this trend is nearly 
absent at the lower levels. Analysis of the political environment made by Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya reveals that the proportion of members of old nomenklatura in the current 
regional administration is still very high: 100% in 1989, 87% in 1992, 72.2% in 1997 and 
56.9% in 2001.38 The trend of slow reduction is rather due to the natural retirement than to 
the direct replacement with new personnel. Kryshtanovskaya also points out that out of 70 
heads of the regions belonging to the liberal camp that were appointed by Boris Yeltsin to 
their posts in 1992-1993, only 47 presented their candidatures for reelection and only 23 out 
of them were reelected. The absolute majority of the reelected heads of regions (87%) are 
those who worked in the Soviet nomenklatura, and a big share of those who lost (37.8%) are 
those who had never been connected to the Soviet elite.  
Resistance to the elite renewal is very pronounced even though all heads of regions 
were elected through general elections. Kryshtanovskaya explains this phenomenon of elite 
preservation by the fact that the incumbent authorities use their privileged position to exert 
influence on different socio-economic groups. Sometimes these manipulation techniques can 
include the falsification of votes, but generally, electoral competition is rigged within legal
limits. 
Information on the lower levels of state officials is lacking, but we assume that they 
either are appointed with the view to fit the general policy of the governor, mayor or speaker 
who would have been elected by general suffrage in the 90s. The problem of representation 
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of the groups other than those connected to the incumbent authorities is revealed through the 
analysis of the composition of the regional parliaments. As the data shows, (Table 1) the 
most efficient rates of participation in the regional elections belong to the incumbent heads 
of regions and cities (63% of registered candidate were reelected), as well as candidates 
from the industry (almost 23% of the candidates are elected), as opposed to the low election 
rate of the representatives of non-governmental organisations (only 9.4% of the registered 
candidates are elected) and all other candidates of social and cultural spheres (14,52% 
elected). These results lead to the conclusion that composition of the regional parliaments is 
dominated by managers of big enterprises and representatives of local political elites. 
Table 1. Participation of different groups in the regional parliamentary elections 1995-1998.
Registered 
candidats
Elected 
candidats
Efficiency of 
participation in 
regional 
elections (%)
Representatives of 
legislative public 
institutions
788 344 43.65
Heads of regions and 
cities (governors and 
mayors)
516 332 64,34
Representatives of 
executive public 
institutions
487 130 26,69
Representatives of non-
governmental 
organisations
764 72 9,42
Representatives from the 
industry 4120 944 22,91
Representatives of other 
spheres 5853 850 14.52
Source: Regional elections to the legislative (representative) public institutions in the Russian Federation, 
1995-1997: Electronnaya Statistica/ Central Electoral Committee of RF; eds., A.V. Ivanchenko,  Ves’ Mir, 
Moscow. 1998. 
Better electoral performance of the incumbent officials can be explained by the fact 
that using their position, officials organise better mediatized election campaigns. Their 
election campaigns are often financially supported by local big businesses.  By contrast, 
representation in the local parliaments of other groups, such as youth, elderly, social 
organisations, representatives of science, education, culture, working class is very limited. 
As was shown before, main competition happens between incumbent officials and 
representatives of the big business. These are the two chief politically powerful groups. 
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Industrial and financial elites in 1997-1998 made up 80% of the local parliament in Perm, in 
Smolensk 70%, Penza, Tobol’sk and Tomsk -60%.39
In order to support the hypothesis that the tendency of the old elite is to hold on to its 
posts and the link between big business and local officials, we present results of the research 
project, “Regional political cycles in Russia”40 carried out by  Akhmed Akhmedov, Alexei 
Ravichev, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. The focus of this research is placed on the phenomenon 
of opportunistic political cycles. Researchers reveal that, “In the pre-election period regional 
governors increase public spending, in particular, expenditures on social programmes, 
healthcare, education and industrial subsidies … after elections public expenditures drop and 
relatively long recession occur.”41 The pre-election improvements increase popularity of the 
incumbent authorities and the probability of them to be reelected. Subsidies to the large 
industrial enterprises also constitute a very important political leverage: according to the 
results of Zhuravskaya and Alexeev expenditures on industry, “Rise by 29% a month before 
elections and fall very gradually for two months after elections” (Appendices. Graph1). 
Researchers also suggest that officials can influence tax-collection: in the pre-election period 
the tax-flow sags down, which researchers explain by authorities’ intention “not to 
overburden enterprises with taxes” (Appendices. Graph 2).
The preservation of Soviet elites implies preservation of the principles and priorities 
valued in the Soviet system of socio-economic organisation. In this regard Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya commented to the newspaper Izvestia on the difference in priorities 
between old and new regional elites which is the subject of her recent research, “The main 
priority of the old regional administration is to keep the social situation above the minimum, 
questions of unemployment, salary payments and support of local industry remain the 
priority. Only two governors stated among their priorities the support of the local small 
business.”42
As the information presented above indicates, the majority of heads of regions carry 
principles that place the preservation of regional socio-economic stability at the forefront of 
their policies. These ideas correspond to the methods of paternalistic regional organisation 
                                                          
39 Elections to the Legislative Regional State Institutions of the Russian Federation (Vybory v zakonodatelniye 
organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub’ectov Rossiyskoi Federacii), 1995-1997: Electronic Statistics/ Central 
Election Committee RF; edt. A.V. Ivanchenko. Moscow: Ves Mir. 1998
40 Akhmed Akhmedov, Alexei Ravichev, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Regional political cycles in Russia, research 
paper is to be presented at the annual Conference of Transition Reforms, 2002 accessed 02.02.2011 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310022
41 Akhmed Akhmedov, Alexei Ravichev, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Regional political cycles in Russia, research 
paper is to be presented at the annual Conference of Transition Reforms, 2002 accessed 02.02.2011 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=310022
42 Beluza, Alexander, Otci I deti crizisa I rynka (Fathers and children of crisis and market), Izvestia, published 
07.7.09, accessed 04.05.2011, http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3130387/
xxxvi
prevalent in the Soviet period. The willingness of the old elites to stay in power is 
complemented with the support coming from the regional industrial sector. It should be 
underlined that these are two groups that exercise the most influence at the regional level. 
Having retained their regional power, regional heads of administration continue to maintain 
regional balance by relying on cooperation with local industry. As was pointed out by Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya, lead researcher in the department of political elites studies in the Russian 
Academy of Science, small business plays in this plan only a marginal role.
3.2 Introduction of the New Institutions: Fiscal System and Federalism
3.2.1 Institution of Federalism
In the beginning of the transition period in Russia, the devolution of power to the 
lower levels of government was viewed as a cornerstone of the passage to the market 
economy. 43   The federal system was recognised to possess a number of advantages 
necessary for achieving this goal. The federal system has shown a strong performance in 
different social structures. First of all, by bringing government closer to people, federalism 
makes economic performance of the territory more efficient. Problems can be solved faster 
as they are made more visible to the decision-makers, at the same time the governing bodies 
are easier controlled by the people. Of course not everything can be done at the local level, 
as central government has the advantages of a scale economy and therefore can run large-
scale projects more efficiently. Undoubtedly, for the countries of the size and cultural, 
ethnical and geographical diversity, such as Russia, federalism is the best-fitting state 
structure.
However, the successful adoption of the federal structure requires the fulfillment of a 
number of criteria which are, however, subject to constant review and amending in the 
scholarly works. The set of necessary conditions for the efficient federal system went from 
the simple idea of devolution of rights and responsibilities to the lower levels of government 
under the assumption that benevolent governments would prioritize over everything the 
resulting increase of social welfare, to more sophisticated policies affecting economic 
incentives of state officials at different levels. Leonid Polishchuk reflects on the ideas of 
market-preserving federalism44 and formulates four criteria necessary to be accomplished 
for successful federal arrangement. First of all, “Allocation of power and resources between 
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levels of government should be adequate to their roles” 45 , that is the subnational 
governments should be given substantial regulatory controls over their local economies; but 
in order to be an efficient local provider of public goods and legal regulator, the 
responsibilities devolved to the subnational governments should be matched with adequate
resources. The second criterion stipulates, “Constraints preventing subnational and central 
governments unilateral interference with each other,” at the same time governments are 
charged with responsibility to preserve, “free trade and resource mobility” between different 
regions. The fourth criterion requires the maintenance of the system through, “Governments’
accountability based on transparency and political competition.”
As was noticed by many observers and researches in the sphere of federalism, to a 
significant extent, these criteria failed to be realised in the Russian federal system. Constant 
negotiations and bargaining over tax-sharing and federal subsidies to regions, as well as the 
questioning of the nature of the federal system itself reveals the unsettled state of relations 
between national, regional and local governments.
The problem of the federal system in Russia is very complex and it includes different 
factors. The problems leading to the general inconsistency of the system originated at 
different levels of government, but for the purpose of this thesis we examine the part of the 
federal system which preconditioned problems in the sphere of taxation. 
3.2.2 Taxation System
As well as the institution of federalism, the taxation system in Russia had to be 
created from scratch. Before the introduction of the fiscal system and the tax code in the 90s, 
the Soviet tax system essentially consisted of residual transfers from the profit-making 
enterprises after deductions for various enterprise funds.46 The Soviet system of taxation 
was fundamentally different from the taxation system in the market economy: in the Soviet
system, the state is the tax-payer and the tax-collector at the same time, so the principle of
calculation and introduction of a certain tax-rate did not have to be fixed in advance and 
often the amount of the tax paid was subject to bargaining between authorities and managers 
of enterprises. The taxation system was one of the most difficult issues of post-Soviet
politics. Tax bases and rates were changing from year to year and often were subject to 
political shows of force or concessions. 
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3.2.3 Fiscal Federalism
Federalism and taxation are closely tied together in what is known as Fiscal 
Federalism, a set of institutions which, in the case of Russia, followed a special path of 
development.  In his work on the efficiency of the federal state organisation, Barry R.
Weingast emphasizes that local governments that raise their own revenue are more likely to 
focus on market-enhancing public goods, while governments that obtain most of their 
revenue from the central government do not have these incentives.47 In other words, type of 
revenue sharing system affects the incentives of subnational government to foster market. 
Since the beginning of decentralisation, local, regional and central governments have 
encountered a number of difficulties in the areas of revenue sharing and expenditure 
responsibilities many of which resulted in tax collection problems.
3.2.4 Changes in the Expenditure Responsibilities
The general inefficiency of the inherited Soviet economy accompanied by the 
withdrawal of the public sector from many economic activities dramatically decreased state 
sources of revenue. In the Soviet budgetary system almost all expenditures were distributed 
by the central government, the problem of federal budget deficit in the years 1992-1993 
prompted the central government to shift a bulk of expenditure responsibilities to regional 
and local governments. Thus, the main expenditures in the social sphere, subsidies to the 
agriculture, transport, investment into the local infrastructure were assigned by the federal 
government to the lower levels. Federal government expenditures decreased progressively 
from 76.5% in 1992 to 52.1% in 1997, and picked up only in the year 2009 to 59.3%. By 
contrast, expenditures assigned to the consolidated regional budget grew progressively from 
23.7% in 1992 to 47.9% in 1997 and 49.1% in 2005 (Table 2). The relative decrease in the 
share of regional budget expenditures responsibilities in 2009 can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the recent centralisation policies, although the trend of assigning higher shares 
of expenditure responsibilities to the lower levels of government has been more pronounced 
so far.
Table 2.Redistribution of expenditures between different levels of government (%) 1992-2009
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 2003 2004 2005 2009
Levels of government 
Federal government 76.3 59.7 56.2 54.9 57.7 52.1 54.4 53.3 50.9 59.35
Consolidated regional 
budget 23.7 40.3 43.8 45.1 42.3 47.9 45.6 46.7 49.1 40.65
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Regional budget 11.5 20.2 23.4 23.2 21.2 - - - 26.1 25.25
Local budget 12.1 20.1 20.3 21.8 21.2 - - - 23 15.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
- No data; there is no available data on the years 1998 -2002 and 2006-2008.
Sources: Russia’s Transition to a New Federalism. Freinkman, Titov, Treisman (1998); Ministry of Finances of 
the RF, Treasury of the RF.
As strict the designation of expenditure responsibilities is not stipulated by the 
Constitution or any other law,48 expenditure responsibilities are distributed following the 
principle of designating responsibilities arising on a particular territory to the government in 
charge of this territory. As a result of these policies, the absolute majority of social-related 
expenditures were to be funded from the subnational budgets.
3.2.4 Development of the Tax Sharing Arrangements
The system of fiscal federalism included three main taxes: value added tax, corporate 
tax and income tax, which were split in varying proportions between federal, regional and 
local governments. Besides, regional and local governments were given the right to collect 
their exclusive taxes. 
Table 3.Tax-sharing arrangements between different levels of government
1992-1998. (shares from the total)
Tax
1991 1992 1993 1994
federal regional federal regional federal regional federal regional
VAT 100 0 80 20 80-50 20-50 75 25
Corporate 
tax 0 100 41 59 31 69 37-34 63-66
Income tax 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100
1995 1996 1997 1998 2005
federal regional federal regional federal regional federal regional federal regional
75 25 75 25 75 25 75 25 100 -
34 66 34 66 34 66 34 66 24 76
10 90 10 90 0 100 40 60 100 50
Source: World Bank 1996. Fiscal Management in the Russian Federation. Washington DC.; 
Ministry of Finance of the RF.
The proportions according to which taxes were shared between different levels of 
government had been subject to constant review (Table 3). Some of the developments were 
openly controversial. Due to a politically motivated decision, a presidential decree which 
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was issued in December 1993 permitted regional governments to introduce new taxes on 
their territories. This tax reform was followed by an explosive growth of different kinds of 
local taxes, which often overlapped the taxes collected to the federal government or taxed 
commercial flows between the regions. Judged as damaging the federal structure the degree 
giving these rights to the regions this decree was abrogated in 1995. Apart from this, in the 
course of development, two major features of the system made themselves distinct. First of 
all, the share of regional and local budgets in shared taxes was subject to the constant change 
through negotiations and lobbying. The other major feature of the system consisted in a fact 
that local and regional taxes were collected more efficiently than the federal ones (Table 4).
Table 4. Tax Revenue in Russia, 1992-117 (% GDP)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Consolidated Budget Tax 
Revenue 29.7 25.5 7.5 23.3 22.3 22.7
Federal Tax Revenue 17.8 11.5 13 11.7 10.7 10.1
Regional Tax Revenue 11.9 14 14.5 11.6 11.6 12.6
GDP (Rs) 19 171.5 610.7 1,630.1 2,200.2 2,602.3
Sources: Daniel Treisman, Russia's Tax Crisis: Explaining Falling Revenues in a Transitional Economy, 1999. 
Economics and Politics, Volume 11, calculated from World Bank operational data.
As shown by the Table 4 tax revenues in Russia after the beginning of transition 
were continuously decreasing from year to year: revenues fell from 29.7 % of GDP in 1992 
to 22.7% of GDP in 1997. At the same time the fall in federal revenues is steeper, it passes 
from 17.8% of GDP in 1992 to 10.1% in 1997, whereas percentage of regionally collected 
revenues remains approximately at the same level and even considerably increases in the 
years 1993-1994. 
Scholars offer several explanations of these tax-collection changes. First, enterprises 
in the regions preferred to pay taxes “in kind” rather than in monetary form, and this was
done more easily at the regional levels. Second, local authorities faced with increasing 
expenditure responsibilities but limited in resources found themselves in a difficult situation 
of meeting the needs of the territories under their control. As Daniel Treisman points out, in 
his research paper “Russia’s Tax Crisis: Explaining Falling Revenues in a Transitional 
Economy,” 49 the fall in tax collection can be explained by, “Perverse incentive in tax 
administration arising from the sharing of tax bases between different levels of 
government.” Also, according to Daniel Treisman, governors had an incentive to, “Collude 
with local enterprise directors to keep part of their profits off the books.” This assessment of 
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the situation is supported by Gerard Turley, according to whom the incentives for the local 
government officials were often skewed towards low tax collection, excessive spending and 
greater concessions to local enterprises.50
Thus, revenue sharing provided little or no fiscal incentives for the local government 
to mobilize revenues or to increase their tax base as any increase in local government 
revenue is taxed away by the federal government. Local governments saw it as more 
efficient and profitable for themselves and the administrated territories to create financial 
flows that would stay within the territories they were in charge of, as it also would be easier 
to control. These requirements are better met through personal relations with local 
businesses.
The process of decentralisation in Russia created as many risks as potential 
opportunities, but the opportunities could be only marginally realized in the institutional 
environment of the time. Decenralisation was initiated from the top levels down, but 
regional and local governments obtained only limited rights with respect to tax collection.51
Budget rights and responsibilities stated in the Constitution of 1993 were not distributed 
clearly between different levels of government,52 which allowed the federal government to 
conclude specific terms of relations with some regions, ignoring others. 
Currently, only 15% of taxes paid by small and medium businesses stay in regional 
budgets and 45% in local budgets, all the rest is transferred to the federal level.53 Rates of 
the most significant taxes such as VAT are changing from year to year often very 
unfavourably to the local and regional budgets. For instance in 1998 the share of federal 
budget in VAT was 75%, in 2000 it increased to 85%, in 2001-2005 the share of VAT kept 
by the federal budget remained at 100%.
Increased spending responsibilities and limited resources put considerable pressure 
on the local and regional governments which boosted incentives for reviving special links 
between local authorities and enterprises. As a result of these developments, it can be 
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concluded that even though the Soviet centralised system collapsed, it created parts of 
administrative markets that were encapsulated in regions, and incoherencies of the fiscal 
federalism facilitated this process.
3.3 Role of the Central Government
In order to reveal the nature of tax-evasion among de novo enterprises the emphasis 
in this work is placed on the relations between local authorities and local businesses,
however, we cannot avoid mentioning the importance of the central government in assuring 
the functionality of institutions.  The state is seen as the main supplier of institutions. More 
precisely, the exclusive role of the central authority consists in ensuring compliance with the 
enforced rules. Democratic government makes the process of political negotiations over 
institutional arrangements visible to the whole society, which reduces the possibility of 
exclusive institutions benefiting only the selected groups. All three branches of the 
government – legislative, judicial and executive are mechanisms that, if implemented 
correctly, can allow the society to arrive at a more egalitarian institutional equilibrium. 
Thrainn Eggertsson states that nature of the state and government structure of a 
country is a critical determinant of the rules structure. To emphasize his statement 
Eggertsson suggests a macro-version of Coase law, “The economic growth and development 
of a country are basically unaffected by the type of government it has, if the cost of 
transacting in both political and economic spheres is zero. However, when transaction costs 
are positive, the distribution of political power within a country and the institutional 
structure of its rule-making institutions are critical factors in economic development.”54
Excessively passive positions of the state towards the formation of the institutional 
environment can lead to the distortion of the rules by the socio-economic groups that take 
advantage of this weakness. Major socio-economic problems originate in the failure of the 
state to perform its regulatory functions. Gerard Turley, in his work on the post-Soviet state 
of affairs in Russia points out that the Russian state had abdicated on its responsibilities to 
enforce the rule of law, build an effective public administration, ensure property rights and 
contract enforcement. He concludes that, “Weakened it became particularly vulnerable to 
the small groups of lobbying and vested interests.”55  As the central government failed to 
provide nation-wide public goods mentioned above, the provision and regulation of them 
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was taken up by the second most significant institution after the central state – the institution 
of administrative markets. The central government’s failure to enforce formal rules led to the 
fragmentation of official institutions. This resulted in the isolation of small regions from the 
nation-wide institutional environment within which relations between economic agents and 
local authorities became more personalized. The institutional environment is based on 
informal institutions many of which are entrenched in social practices and date back to the 
Soviet time.
3.4 Role of the Tax Administration Authorities
The presence and practice of tax-evasion is well known by the authorities: in 1997 
out of 2.8 ml. registered enterprises 0.6 ml. (21.4%) did not submit declaration on business 
activity to the tax authorities. On one hand, the difficulty of dealing with the phenomenon 
lies in its sheer scale, the practice is very widespread and its mechanisms are well 
elaborated, the speed with which a fictitious firm is created and liquidated does not allow 
authorities to collect a sufficient amount of information to detect it as the payment of 
salaries in cash are almost impossible to prove unless the information is divulged by an 
insider. On the other hand, impunity with which these schemes are created, present the tax 
authorities as being reluctant to solve tax-evasion crimes. This can be connected to the 
personilisation of relations not only between local state officials and business, but also 
between state officials and tax authorities. Even though tax authorities situated in the regions 
are not directly subordinate to the local officials, they can be under certain influence to 
modify their practices to comply with the local policy. 
As was shown earlier, by researchers Akhmed Akhmedov, Alexei Ravivhev, 
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya Zhuravskaya in their work “Regional political cycles in Russia,”56
the variability of the tax collection in the region is closely connected to the occurrence of 
regional elections which shows the link between taxation and regional policy. This kind of 
“pre-election” tax non-payment is effectively approved of by the regional authorities. Also, 
evidence suggests that tax officers being under certain influence of the local authorities are 
more vigorous at collecting local taxes.
4. New business-state relations
4.1 Varying Terms of Relations between State Officials and Businesses
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Relations between small de novo businesses and authorities are a part of broader 
network of connections that involves businesses of all sizes. The main characteristic feature 
of these interactions remains informal, although terms of relations can vary significantly 
depending on the size and importance of businesses from the point of view of officials. By 
looking at a wider spectrum of terms specifying interaction between authorities and 
businesses we can better understand what place in this system is reserved to the small de 
novo businesses. We consider that tax-evasion is just one fragment of this system and in 
order to be able to describe and analyse preconditions and consequences of this practice we 
make a brief study of relations between authorities and other forms of businesses.
Tax-avoidance practices are not initiated only by the de novo small businesses, it is a
business strategy commonly used also by privatised, state and bigger de novo enterprises. 
However, if creation of fictitious firms is more common for de novo enterprises, because 
they are small and numerous and therefore difficult to be checked; bigger businesses are 
more visible and this strategy is riskier for them. Instead they are known to use their more 
important social and economic position to create direct link with local officials. Often the 
goal of this relationship is to get preferential treatment which is usually expressed in the 
form of tax exemptions, subsidies, government loans or registration in an off-shore zone.
These strategies are generally inaccessible for small businesses, mainly because individual 
entrepreneurs of smaller size are less important economically, but also because their
financial resources are limited and they cannot expand business activity over several 
regions, as for example, in the case of off-shore registration for the purpose of tax reduction.
Further, by using the term “big business” we designate businesses which cannot be 
characterised as de novo small and medium enterprises, that is they are of big or medium 
size, privatised or state-owned.  One of the mechanisms that establishes the link between 
authorities and big businesses is the provision of subsidies. Many studies indicate the 
different kinds of financial support provided by regional authorities to the big businesses.
Regional budgets have become a relatively more important source of subsidies and transfers 
that remained in the economy since subsidies funded by federal government were cut 
dramatically over 1992-1995. By contrast, subsidies funded by regions, demonstrate an 
opposite trend by progressively increasing during 1992-95.57 The total volume of subsidies 
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funded by regions in 1995 amounted to 5,2 % of GDP, while the federal government  spent 
less than 2% of GDP on the same purposes. Similarly, in 1995 regional governments 
provided more than 1% of GDP in tax exemptions, which constituted 20% of their funded 
budget subsidies.
According to the results of a Lev Freinkman study, the regional allocation of 
subsidies is biased towards regionally dominated industries and strong sectoral interest 
groups, but there is no substantial support for private business. This information coincides 
with the results of the analysis presented earlier on the regional political elites58: local and 
regional heads of administration have strong preferences to first attend to problems
concerning local big industries, employment and salary payments. Here, a comparison can 
be made with the state-industry relations common in the Soviet time, when big local 
industries were supported as they were the only employment providers and were considered 
as the backbone of local social and economic life. As the evidence suggests, this attitude 
persists.
However, transfers to enterprises on the regional level are insufficiently documented, 
and there are no reliable public finance statistics to clarify the structure of local spending on 
the enterprise sector. The growing share of regional subsidies to enterprises is either 
reflected in the budget items “loans” or “others” or provided from outside of the regional 
budget altogether (regional extra budgetary funds). More information helping to locate the 
link between big businesses and authorities was collected in interviews and will be provided 
further.
4.2 Study of the link between small businesses and authorities
In this section we describe and analyse the nature of relations between small business 
and authorities on the basis of two sets of personal interviews taken by researchers with the 
representatives of business community. In order to accentuate the specificity of relations 
between authorities and small business we compare it to the relations entertained between 
authorities and big businesses. Compared to the big business-authorities interconnection, 
the unofficial link between small businesses and authorities is less visible. As these relations 
are not secured by significant financial transfers as in the case of big businesses they attract 
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less attention and as a consequence are less exposed to external consideration. Personal in-
depth interviews with businessmen provide the most information in order to reveal the 
nature of these relations. 
Results of the research by Vadim Radaev:
One of the most comprehensive studies based on in-depth interviews with 
representatives of business community was carried out in 1998 under the supervision of 
Vadim Radaev. 59  Interviewees in the study are managers and owners of different types of 
enterprises. This study provides information on the basis of which the analysis on the nature 
of the state-business relation can be made. 
First of all, the results of this study point out the high incidence of bribe extortion by 
officials from businessmen: 48.5 % of the respondents said that they know that extortions 
happen sometimes, and 38.5% that they know that they happen often. Interviews also help 
to uncover the difference in relations between officials with small and big businesses: more 
complaints of bribes extortions come from private de novo businesses – 69%, whereas 
privatised enterprises are relatively less affected – 46%.
Further investigation into the question of business-state relations reveals that the 
phenomenon is more complex: only 28% of respondents place all responsibility for bribery 
solely on officials. More than one quarter of respondents emphasized shared responsibility
for bribery, and 18% of respondents consider businessmen as the main initiators of bribes. 
For 31% of small businesses the main initiator of bribery is the state official, whereas for big 
businesses only 17%.  
According to Radaev’s analysis the willingness to maintain the informal contacts 
exists both in the business community and state officials, although business community is 
not a monolith and has different interests and capabilities. Information collected by Radaev 
allowed him to reveal several segments of business which are characterised by different 
terms of relations with officials.  First, there is a high correlation between size of the 
business and financial support received by the business: privatised and state-owned 
companies enjoy bigger support than the de novo ones. Radaev discerns a group of 
enterprises which he calls “loyal to authorities”. This group is generally satisfied with the 
state of affairs in relations with bureaucracy, this group also receives a higher percentage of 
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government aid – 15% of respondents in this group received financial aid from the 
authorities, whereas respondents from other groups that benefited from state financial aid 
totaled only 5%. Eighty two percent of “loyal to authorities group” is made up by privatised 
enterprises, majority of which (46%) are big and medium enterprises, and 33% of them are 
partly state-owned. By contrast, small business is most usually privately financed (family, 
friends).
These figures coincide with the description of business relations with authorities in 
Russia provided by Gerald Turley, “The enterprise sector in Russia is not monolithic. We 
can distinguish between state, privatised and new private companies, with de novo private 
firms showing strong performance relative to both-state owned and privatized.  Each of 
these three categories is likely to have different relationships with state. Often the incumbent 
(state or privatised) is protected by the subnational governments whereas de novo private 
forms are often harassed by the state.”60  Having admitted an active role played both by 
authorities and businessmen, Radaev underlines that it is faulty to consider businessmen and 
bureaucrats as being equally powerful economic actors. He points out that state officials are 
more powerful institutional agents as they are invested with capacity to introduce and 
manipulate regulations, thus businessmen are more dependent on officials than otherwise. 
Results of the research by Andrei Yakovlev:
The next study conducted by Andrei Yakovlev61 reinforces but also extends the 
assessment made by Radaev. According to Yakovlev, the current situation on the regional 
level can be described as a system of exchanges between business and the state. Like 
Radaev, his interviews with entrepreneurs show that modes of cooperation with the state 
officials vary depending on the size and the history of development and ownership of the 
enterprise. There are enterprises that appear to be distant from the state authorities, which do 
not receive state support; and there is a marginal group (5% of all enterprises surveyed) 
which receives support but develop its business very inefficiently. The enterprises that 
receive the most support from the state are also the most dynamic. In the opinion of 
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Yakovlev, the business-state connection has become more efficient, but also more 
personalised.
The closed networks and personal exchanges that exist between authorities and managers of 
enterprises reduce the risk of exposure to the general public and media, hence the risk of 
being found out or implicated into an informal network is reduced.62 As Radaev indicates, 
there are only 30% of respondents who consider involvement into informal state-business 
activities extremely dangerous, whereas those who think that risk is minimal amount to 57% 
of the surveyed.  Thus, it can be concluded, that formal norms are considered by economic 
actors just as formality which can be safely circumvented. 
4.3 Specificity of Relations between Small De Novo Enterprises and Authorities within 
the Institution of Administrative Markets
                In this thesis we call the system that governs the informal interaction between 
authorities and businesses the institution of administrative markets. This institution is built 
on informal and personalised relations where authorities play the main role by trying to 
organise the business community in a manner to serve their needs. By imposing the 
administrative barriers, authorities induce to participate in the alternative institutional 
network which is based on personal contact, often directly between businessmen and local 
officials.
The revealed, with the help of in-depth interviews, structure of relations proves that 
there is demand as well as supply for special terms of relations. The supply of this 
alternative institution is provided by officials and predominantly local officials because this 
institution is informal and requires personal contact. Demand on the part of business is 
stimulated by the imposition of different obstacles in the form of excessive regulation or
high taxation and related to control measures (frequent inspections, fines etc.).
Different factors push businesses to create special personal relations with local 
officials. Among those that can be counted are: attempts to maintain competitiveness 
through legal and semi-legal means, rent-seeking, attempts to avoid excessive regulation and 
tax burden. Another important factor is the instability of the formal institutional 
development: frequent changes in legislature and weak enforcement of existing laws. As a 
result economic actors view informal institutions as more reliable.
According to the information collected in the course of the presented interviews, big 
businesses are found more likely to initiate the informal links with officials, in all likelihood 
to facilitate further development of their business activities. They are also assessed to be the 
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most likely recipients of government aid. By contrast, small businesses have the least 
amount of influence on the state officials, as they were created recently and therefore do not
have any special contacts with the regional authorities which could be dating back to the 
Soviet time; neither they have substantial resources to be politically noticeable. Small 
business is a less likely candidate for financial support from authorities in a form of 
subsidies or grants. Compared to big businesses, small enterprises are more distanced from 
authorities; also, they are the main group of businessmen to indicate extortions from the 
legal authorities.
4.4 Reinventing the Old Structure of Administrative Markets: Legal Extension of the 
Administrative Market
We estimate that the system of administrative markets was developed in the Soviet
period, the main characteristics of which are preserved after the disappearance of the Soviet
economic and political institutions. The institution of administrative markets finds new force 
from the inconsistencies of the new institutional system, but also it evolves by adjusting 
itself to the changing environment. Thus, under the pressure of being prosecuted as an illegal 
activity it had created the legalised forms of the alternative institution. In all but name they 
serve to circumvent formal rules. I will cover three forms of these activities: companies that 
help to organise tax-evasion schemes, licensing agencies and forced sponsorship.
1. The organisation of the tax-evasion schemes for the most part is realised through 
the financial companies that are closely associated with small banks. The main purpose of 
these financial companies is to facilitate different semi-shadow business activities, such as 
the registration of fictitious firms. These companies are legally registered and thrive on the 
inconsistencies of the institutional environment by helping other companies to pursue 
effectively illegal activities. This practice is so wide-spread that it leads to the question if the 
relevant authorities do not prefer to turn a blind eye to these activities
2. The proliferation of the middlemen between state and business is another recent 
trend in the Russian economy: various licensing and registration agencies tend to 
agglomerate around public offices with the stated purpose to speed up the paperwork. These 
agencies provide, at a special fee, numerous documents demanded by the authorities for 
registration and licensing procedures. The companies applying for registration or licensing 
have to go through fairly complicated procedures for accomplishment of which not all 
information is easily available, thus, businessmen prefer to resort to the services offered by 
these agencies.
lResearches of the Center of Independent Social Research think that today we can observe an 
explosive growth of a sector made up by quite official intermediary agencies, through which, 
however, pass significant illegal money transfers. “The more official regulation becomes strict,
commented researcher of the project Irina Olimpieva, the more expands the activities of 
intermediation between state and business, which ultimately serve their informal interests.  
Tightening of regulation didn’t go unnoticed, habitual envelops became archaic. Nonetheless
extortions didn’t disappear. In the situation of regulatory deadlock everyone is expected to figure out 
for himself that neither indignant protests nor offers to solve everything with certain sums of money 
will help you to solve the situation. You should act in a civilized way and visit the indicated agency.
This agency, for example, can sell you fire extinguishers at a price three times exceeding the market 
price, but this action alone will make all controlling agencies very friendly to you. Besides, 
formalization of the procedure appeases the moral climate. “The right to give a bribe is earned 
through begging and humiliation. But in case of resorting to the intermediary agent the whole 
procedure becomes a mere buy-and-sell transaction, it is quite formal and everyone involved 
respects each other”. In short, relations between state and business are getting completely 
civilized.63
Authorities often indicate what exact agencies their clients need to address. The redundancy 
of these agencies and elevated charges for numerous documents evokes comparison of their 
services to the legalised form of bribery.  
3. Another form of the new kind of relations between authorities and businessmen is 
the growing involvement of the latter in the sponsorship activities. Social partnership is a 
well known form of cooperation, but in this case it has an element of forceful involvement. 
This kind of cooperation has numerous examples covered in the media. For instance, it was 
reported that the governor of Kemerovsky Krai Alan Tuleev obliged all local businessmen to 
participate financially in the local social project.64 Participation is obligatory for all who 
received invitations sent out by the governor office. Local businessmen view this initiative 
as a shifting of responsibility for social projects from local authorities to the local 
enterprises. Businessmen estimate that participation in this project will increase the cost of 
their business activities and impede further development.
There are also reports on more routine contributions from small businesses. 
Journalists of the newspaper Izvestia report on the cases of forceful contribution of small 
businesses to the local budgets.
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Everybody knows now that businessmen are charged with keeping the adjacent to their offices 
territory in order. This territory may include the unpaved roads around and long unattended bushes 
and trees in the park nearby. Otherwise several serious men and women can come to your office 
without any warning to check compliance of your business activity with numerous regulations. After 
a couple of violations of the state code have been found, officials point out to the territory around 
your office: “Do you enjoy working in this dirt?” Before leaving your office the controlling 
committee will show you the address of the agency charged with cleaning this territory according to 
the municipal administration order. All you need to do is to pay the bill. This kind of “voluntary” 
action will cost you not less than $500.65
Big businesses having more important financial resources are more willing to 
participate in the social partnership with local officials. Businessmen recognise that besides 
good causes that these activities sometimes serve, it is an important lobbying leverage.  
According to the survey of 200 businesses undertaken by the Coordination Committee of 
Employers, 80% of surveyed managers and owners feel accrued interest of authorities in the 
joint projects. But, contrary to their expectations, they don’t feel that even through 
participation they can significantly influence local socio-economic policies. 66 The 
Phenomenon of legalization of informal connections between business and state authorities
is growing very fast. It presents substantial support for the institution of administrative 
markets.
4.5 Preservation of Bad Equilibrium: Negative economic consequences inflicted by the 
Alternative Institution
            Currently, the relations between de novo businesses and local authorities are in the 
state of equilibrium. This equilibrium had hardly changed in the decades of transitional 
reforms. We estimate that this equilibrium is maintained by the institution of administrative 
markets. The only socio-economic groups that can benefit from this arrangement are corrupt 
authorities and to some extend big businesses that gain a privileged position through close 
association with state officials. In many regions the business is seen not as an independent 
economic agent, but as a structure integrated into the administrative markets in order to 
solve local socio-economic problems.
As was shown earlier in the work, the tax-evasion schemes are created in order to 
maintain competitiveness, but also in order to accumulate additional funds which are then 
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disbursed in the corruption networks. High taxation and other regulatory procedures which 
are perceived by business as additional transaction costs push business into semi-legal 
shadow economy, which eventually supports the alternative institution of administrative 
markets. From the analysis of the relations between authorities and de novo enterprises made 
in this thesis we can conclude that a part of the money concealed from taxation through the 
evasion schemes, is nonetheless paid to the authorities but in the form of either personal 
bribes or contributions under the guise of sponsorship or corporate responsibility. High 
taxation and complicated regulation of business activity is seen by many scholars, such as V. 
Radaev, as an instrument to preserve the current institutional equilibrium.67
Socio-economic equilibrium based on the personalised relations, besides multiple side-
effects that can have repercussions in various parts of society, has several more narrowly 
defined consequences:
1. The institution of alternative markets significantly distorts competition. As tax 
evasion entered into the entrenched practices of the entrepreneurs used predominantly to 
reduce the costs of production and increase competitiveness, the mechanism became 
indispensable for new firms entering the market in order to be competitive. The agility in 
this matter had become a new competitive advantage, so it forces all businesses including 
the publicly shared ones to enter the competition of reducing tax liabilities by different 
means.
2. As businesses extend their operation into the shadow economy trough the reduction 
of turn-over accounts they deny themselves the possibilities of growth: small businesses 
with low benefits have fewer chances to obtain credits and grants and as a consequence can’t 
invest into further development. Implication into the shadow activity becomes a significant 
obstacle, especially for small businesses, as they don’t have enough initial financial 
resources to be considered sufficiently important neither by local officials nor by private 
investors to receive grants or investment. 
3. Reputation and transparency of business activities are directly connected to the 
chances of an enterprise to attract new investors. These are two characteristics that are lost 
as a business enters the shadow economic activities. As pointed out Dmitri Syrotkin, 
researcher in a business consulting company Alt to the newspaper Vedomosti, “opaqueness 
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of business activities often becomes an inferiority complex of managers and employees. 
Company avoids exposure, doesn’t inform personnel on the results of company’s 
activities”.68
4. Alternative institutions have many negative consequences on the whole society, one 
of which is redistribution of wealth which passes through not publicly accountable 
institutions but through channels connecting the selected socio-economic groups. The 
approximate losses caused only by the tax-evading practice through unregistered cash 
transactions in the years 1992-1996 amount 40bl. rubles69, a significant part of which is 
spent on unofficial payments to the authorities. Even if some part of the money that is saved 
by entrepreneurs through the tax-evasion schemes and is later reinvested in the business, it is 
to a large extent wasted; for the reasons stated above it can be hardly used to expand 
business operation and instead is dispersed on consumption purposes.
5. Involvement in shadow activities puts all businesses in a situation of dependence on 
the arbitrary decision of unscrupulous authority. As the tax evasion is factually permitted to 
a limit, businesses are required to cooperate with the local authorities. Effectively, 
businesses find themselves in the situation of suspension: they can be charged with a breach 
of the Tax Code at any moment, which makes it hard to expand planning horizons with a 
needed degree of certainty, but also forces businesses to continue making contributions to 
the public authorities.
             From this analysis we conclude that small business is caught in a situation of 
inefficient institutional equilibrium and finds itself in the least advantageous position. 
Admitting the inefficiency of their position, the small businesses lack economic and political 
resources to change this equilibrium.
III) Finding a New Equilibrium
1. What Measures Have Been Undertaken
The economic problems indicated in the thesis are known by public as well as they 
were admitted at all levels of government. The following measures were elaborated to 
correct the situation.
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1. Anti-corruption programme – the problem of corruption has been recognised by 
different political figures and commitments to take measures against it have been repeatedly 
announced. The main steps in this direction undertaken so far is the policy to reduce the
bureaucratic apparatus to the efficient size and create channels such as the so called “open 
window” programme through which complains on corruption can be filed.
2. The government has introduced the reform of the Tax Code with the purpose of 
liberalisation and simplification of tax procedures. The reform was introduced on 1 January 
2001, but amendments to it are still being made. The reduction of tax rates and flattening of 
the tax rate scale, introduction of the regressive social tax rate resulted in total reduction of 
tax liabilities of 1% of GDP70. However, the reform is still in progress: many complaints 
were made on the increased paperwork engendered by the recent changes, as tax 
declarations have to be submitted now to more than one controlling state agency.
3. Excessive independence of the regional governments was estimated as a threat to
budgetary stability. The main step in the strengthening of the position of federal center in 
relation with the regional and local governments took place with issuing of the presidential 
decree creating aggregate federal districts. The system of appointment of the governors by 
the federal center was established. Nonetheless, it is not clear yet how this shift of the 
political power to the center will influence business-state relations in regions.
4. Law prosecuting the creation of fictitious firms was passed in February 2011. More 
severe measures are taken against the initiators of schemes as well as individuals and 
companies involved in them (up to 8 years of imprisonment for initiators as well as 
accomplices). However, many experts think that this measure alone without significant 
advancement in anti-corruption will lead to the collapse of small business activity –
administrative pressure on small business in the form of different kinds of extortions is very 
high.71
Even after the introduction of changes to the Tax Code, and after more controversial 
changes in the federal structure, the nature of relations between business and state officials 
remains highly personalised and differentiated according to economic and thus political 
importance of enterprises. As has been shown the administrative markets have a large
capacity of adjusting to the changing institutional environment. The measures listed above 
                                                          
70
Yakovlev, Andrei, “Business and Society. Corruption Tax”, Vedomosti, 27.11.2008.
71 Kolesnilkov, Andrei, Sokratit’sia li kolichestvo firm odnodnevok v Moskve? (Will the number of fictitious 
firms in Moscow decrease?), Vedomosti, accessed 05.05.2011, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2000/10/13/21711
lv
cannot be denied their potential value, but in our view more attention should be given to the 
development of political market as a place of negotiation and promotion of institutions.
2. The Importance of Development of the Political Market
Institutions are offered on the political market where the likelihood of their official 
acceptance depends on the political power of the interest groups which promote them. In a 
situation of imperfect political markets, the less powerful groups would have to function in 
the created institutional environment even if the effects of it can be damaging to the interests 
and socio-economic position of these groups. In this work we estimated that small and 
medium de novo business are caught in such lock-in situation.
Reaction strategies of economic agents in the situation of disagreement to the 
existing policy was formulated by Hirschman in his work “Voice, Exit and Loyalty.”72 In 
the dichotomy “voice-exit,” Hirschman proposes two strategies with which the unwanted 
situation can be changed or avoided, “The more inconsistent a policy is with preferences of a 
given sector the more that sector is likely to be politically involved … or migrate out of the 
city if more attractive alternatives are available.” 73  We employ this theoretical concept in 
order to analyse strategies that can be undertaken by small de novo enterprises in the
situation of inefficient institutional equilibrium for them. 
First we look at the interrelation of these options. An “exit” strategy is easier to 
follow because does not require coordination with other actors. For small businesses it might 
mean not only moving out of the territory but also abandoning the business. The problem for 
the small business here is that movement to other regions can engender high costs for 
owners, managers and employees. Small businesses in Russia often lack resources to move. 
For them, the strategy of exit more likely means the abandoning business activity altogether. 
The strategy of “voice” includes opposition to the existing order through individual or 
collective action. In our case this strategy would include professional organisation, such as 
associations and unions in order to collectively defend common interests. Big associations 
are more politically visible and represent significant force on regional and national level. 
Unfortunately, this strategy is so far very little developed in Russia: according to the 
results of the survey realised by First All-Russia Congress of Small Businesses, 38% of 
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surveyed businessmen think that it is necessary to influence the bureaucrats in order to 
change the relationship between state and business. However, the specificity of Russian 
business community is that instead of organized lobbying of common interests through 
business associations and unions, businessmen prefer establishing personal contacts with 
officials (91.3% of surveyed)74, which reproduces and maintains the informal institution. 
To the three strategies proposed, Hirschman Vadim Radaev adds the fourth strategy 
defined as “bargain”, which in his view, helps to describe specificity of relations between 
business and state authorities in Russia.75 According to this strategy, business and officials 
negotiate the terms of special agreement which would accommodate each other’s interests.  
Bargain strategy leads to the institutional compromise, that is to the enforcement of existing, 
even if inefficient, institutional arrangement. Along with the newly arranged order, the 
official institution is preserved; deemed as malfunctioning it increases the value of the 
unofficial institution.
To summarize, the less powerful socio-economic groups have several strategies to 
counteract the undesirable arrangement. In our view, the “bargain” strategy described by 
Radaev is the least efficient one as it preserves the existing situation with all negative 
consequences for the least advantageous group. The “exit” strategy implies avoidance, but 
should not be considered as entirely passive. Enabling the business to move more freely can 
raise awareness of the bad and good regional institutional arrangements and create healthy 
competition between regional administrations.
The “voice” strategy requires the most of resources and efforts of collective 
organisation although the results of it on the empowerment of the less advantageous groups 
of interests can be more efficient and more lasting.  Based on this analysis we conclude that 
in order to develop an efficient institutional environment, the society should take care of 
developing an efficient political market where the strategy of “voice” could be more easily 
employed and therefore the possibility of more powerful groups benefiting at the expense of 
others is limited.  In the next section we will consider what more concrete measures can be 
taken in the situation of described inefficient institutional equilibrium.
3. Recommendations
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We look at the given lock-in situation from the perspective of institutions as the main 
factors of development. As we concluded that institutions are created and promoted by the 
politically strongest interest groups on the political market we set to develop 
recommendations that would facilitate the empowerment of weaker groups. Also we propose 
measures to change incentives of more powerful groups, so the shift from the current 
inefficient equilibrium will be more acceptable for them.  We consider the alternative 
institution of administrative markets as an impediment to a more equal distribution of wealth 
in a given society. In particular, relations between the state and the enterprise sector should 
be made more formal and more egalitarian within an appropriate institutional setting. 
The institution of administrative markets doesn’t belong to the category of informal 
institutions which could be formalized to become an official formal institution. This 
institution was designed to benefit only selected groups, thus we consider it as inherently 
counter-productive. The measures that we propose include:
1. Political empowerment of the small and medium businesses. As was mentioned in 
the previous section, well organised business associations lack in Russia, and those that exist 
find it sometimes difficult to assert themselves politically. One of the attempts to form a 
united front defending the position of small and medium de novo businesses is the business 
association OPOR. It advocates importance of the small business as an independent 
economic actor endowed with equal rights in terms of influence on institutional environment 
with the big business and the state. The main priority in this sphere should be given to the 
provision of access to the small business to the legislating procedure before laws enter into 
force. Small business should be an active participant of the institutions that regulate business 
activities.
2. Measures to give a larger share of tax revenues to the regional and local 
governments. As was mentioned before, currently only 15% of taxes collected from the 
small and medium businesses stay at the regional and 45% at the local level, the rest is 
transferred to the federal budget. Tax sharing arrangements, as they are now, undermine 
fiscal responsibilities of the local governments. Underfunding of regional governments 
stimulates regional authorities to create special arrangements with local business to 
compensate for underfunding. In order to break the abusive link between local governments 
and local enterprises, the bigger part of taxes collected from the business activities should 
stay in the regions. This will give incentive to the local governments to develop business 
environment as a source of budget revenues within the legal means.
IV) Conclusion
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The theory of neoinstitutionalism stresses the lasting effect of institutions. Analysis 
made in this work covered one of the most persisting forms of socio-economic arrangements 
in recent Russian history introduced and maintained by the alternative institution of 
administrative markets.  A special type of relations between the enterprise sector and state
authorities started to develop as a reaction to the distortions of the Soviet economy, and then 
became itself a sustainable institution covering various socio-economic interactions. The 
administrative markets can be characterised as a sort of symbiosis that permits state 
authorities and enterprise managers to function outside of the formal institutional setting by 
realising their own particular interests often at the expense of the rest of society. The 
exclusive nature of this institution has extensively modified the market-supporting 
institutions introduced after the collapse of the Soviet system and, as a consequence, altered 
behaviour of the newly created economic actors. We identified small and medium de novo 
enterprises as a group directly most unfavourably affected by the institution of 
administrative markets which is manifested in the persistent practice of tax evasion.
The practice of tax evasion is clearly not unique to Russian economy, but the scale 
and impunity with which tax-evasive schemes have come to be used there, point to the fact 
that this practice has become effectively institutionalised. Analysis of the facts collected on 
this issue allowed us to conclude that tax evasion activities undertaken by small and medium
de novo enterprises became embedded in the structure of the institution of administrative 
markets.
In the course of the study we identified several primary and secondary factors that 
make up and support this institution. Firstly, it is the old Soviet elites that almost invariably 
remained in power at the regional level preserving the form of the state-enterprise relation 
dominated by the arbitrary decision-making of the state officials. Secondly, the 
inconsistently introduced institution of fiscal federalism which stipulated the increasing 
expenditure responsibilities delegated to the subnational governments accompanied by the 
insufficient rights of tax-collection, aggravated the existing dysfunctions of the system and 
gave to the local officials the incentives to create a special sort of personalised relations with 
the business community. These relations allowed the local officials to keep resources within 
their respective territories by collecting taxes through the informal channels.
Such form of “state authorities-enterprise sector” fusion benefited first of all the 
corrupt bureaucrats, the heads of regions trying to support their territories at any cost, and to 
some extent to the big politically visible enterprises, but transpired to the small de novo 
businesses in the form of complicated regulation, pervasive red tape and frequent arbitrary 
control measures followed by lofty fines.
lix
The involvement of small businesses into the structure of special state-enterprise 
relations was prompted by the imposition of a multitude of administrative barriers. Just like 
in the Soviet economy, individuals supporting the alternative institution also make up a part 
of the formal institutions. Despite taking the posts in official institutions, civil servants act as 
independent economic actors. Using their privileged positions, bureaucrats can change the 
structure of transaction costs in the economy. By imposing administrative barriers in a form 
of complex regulation and arbitrary decisions, the transaction costs of acting within the 
official system become prohibitively high, which drives individuals to enter the alternative 
institution. Effectively, the tax evasion schemes are used in order to cut expenses imposed 
by the administrative market. These practices can be interpreted as an innovative strategy of 
adaptation and survival in the institutional environment distorted by the institution of 
alternative markets.
As a result, formal taxation gives way to informal taxation, the money saved by 
entrepreneurs through the shadow schemes are paid to the authorities in the form of a bribe 
or “charity” financial contributions to the local budget. This contribution is more direct and 
always stays in the region, and an unofficial payment to the authority helps to solve various 
problems in the fields of excessive taxation, licensing or registration. Thus, taxation, which 
is theoretically not an exchange, through intermediation of the institution of administrative 
market, becomes a local and personal exchange.  
To a large extent, small businesses prefer to participate in this arrangement, even if 
in the long run they lose more than they gain, the gains being uncertain and temporary. 
Small and medium enterprises are in the least advantageous position: taken separately they 
are not big enough to impose their own terms of cooperation, neither they are significant 
enough to change the institutional environment governing their business activity.
One of the major economic factors dictating the development of the business-state 
officials’ relations is the factor of uncertainty. The situation of uncertainty is imposed 
primarily by the disengagement of the central government from its responsibilities to enforce 
laws imposed by formal institutions. Thus, not being able to rely on protection by law, 
individuals are pushed to choose defensive short-term strategies involving potentially illegal 
schemes. 
The resulting situation is inefficient. Business in general is seen as an element 
integrated into local economic structures in a position of subordination to the state 
authorities. It denies to a significant number of individuals who are not included to 
exclusive benefit groups with an opportunity to prosper through their private business 
activities. It dwarfs the growth of the small start-ups, but also it limits the flow of wealth 
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only to the select socio-economic groups, imposing high costs on others. More than being 
economically-crippling institution this is a persistently economically-crippling institution. 
The effects of the administrative markets are recognised to be distortive; nonetheless the 
situation remains in the state of equilibrium supported by the interest groups benefiting from 
it. 
Why is the institution of administrative markets so difficult to combat? One of the 
answers is that this institution is informal and mechanisms of its functionality are hidden 
from external observation. They are kept in the shadow by powerful political groups, so it is 
difficult to expose concrete facts and personalities. Criticism directed at state officials is 
often ignored. Another answer is that the state officials that constitute the backbone of this 
institution are more powerful institutional actors than those groups that suffer from state 
officials’ activities. At the same time, the institution of administrative markets is very 
adaptive, for instance, in response to the increased anti-corruption pressure it had developed 
legalised forms of its activities. All these factors help to keep the institution functional 
through years.
Unless a sufficient constituency for market-oriented reforms is organised, the 
situation of institutional lock-in will remain without significant change for a long time. 
Empowerment of small businesses is possible only through their self-organisation in unions 
and business associations. This will give them more weight to participate in negotiations on 
laws and regulatory arrangements on equal footing with state officials and big business.
Another necessary step in order to shift the current equilibrium is the engagement 
with politically powerful groups. More recognised and better regulated rights should be 
given to the local administration so the institution of the administrative markets becomes
less “efficient” in the eyes of the key economic players. The personalisation of relations 
between business and state officials should be restrained by well defined and strictly 
enforced legislation. This role is reserved to the central government as it should ensure the 
enforcement of the passed laws.
For the development of an efficient institutional environment, the participation of the 
whole society is required. The exclusion of certain groups leads to institutional distortion. 
To change the entrenched socio-economic practices is possible only through the concerted 
efforts of the groups interested in institutional evolution, combined with the participation of 
a strong central government acting as a guardian and regulator of the laws, and the 
engagement of the opposing groups which can be done through the policies of concession 
and restriction.
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Graph 1. Expenditures on the industry before and after regional elections.
Point 0 on the graph designates the moment when regional elections take place.
Source: Akhmed Akhmedov, Alexei Ravichev, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Regional political 
cycles in Russia, 2002
Graph 2. Dynamics of tax collection before and after regional elections.
Source: Akhmed Akhmedov, Alexei Ravichev, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Regional political 
cycles in Russia, 2002
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